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ABSTRACT  
Humans are particularly adept at modifying their behavior in accordance with changing 
environmental demands. Through various mechanisms of cognitive control, individuals are able to 
tailor actions to fit complex short- and long-term goals. The research described in this thesis uses 
functional magnetic resonance imaging to characterize the neural correlates of cognitive control at 
two levels of complexity: response inhibition and self-control in intertemporal choice. First, we 
examined changes in neural response associated with increased experience and skill in response 
inhibition; successful response inhibition was associated with decreased neural response over time 
in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, a region widely implicated in cognitive control, 
providing evidence for increased neural efficiency with learned automaticity. We also examined a 
more abstract form of cognitive control using intertemporal choice. In two experiments, we 
identified putative neural substrates for individual differences in temporal discounting, or the 
tendency to prefer immediate to delayed rewards. Using dynamic causal models, we characterized 
the neural circuit between ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area involved in valuation, and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in self-control in intertemporal and dietary 
choice, and found that connectivity from dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to ventromedial prefrontal 
cortex increases at the time of choice, particularly when delayed rewards are chosen. Moreover, 
estimates of the strength of connectivity predicted out-of-sample individual rates of temporal 
discounting, suggesting a neurocomputational mechanism for variation in the ability to delay 
gratification. Next, we interrogated the hypothesis that individual differences in temporal 
discounting are in part explained by the ability to imagine future reward outcomes. Using a novel 
paradigm, we imaged neural response during the imagining of primary rewards, and identified 
negative correlations between activity in regions associated the processing of both real and 
imagined rewards (lateral orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, respectively) and 
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the individual temporal discounting parameters estimated in the previous experiment. These data 
suggest that individuals who are better able to represent reward outcomes neurally are less 
susceptible to temporal discounting. Together, these findings provide further insight into role of the 
prefrontal cortex in implementing cognitive control, and propose neurobiological substrates for 
individual variation.  
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   C h a p t e r  1
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
"Like the entomologist in pursuit of brightly coloured butterflies, my attention hunted, in the flower 
garden of the gray matter, cells with delicate and elegant forms, the mysterious butterflies of the 
soul, the beating of whose wings may some day – who knows? – clarify the secret of mental life." 
 
– Santiago Ramón y Cajal1 
 
Preamble 
Like many before me, I find myself obsessed by a single cell: the neuron. How is it that the entirety 
of the human experience can be defined by a network of tiny cells and their hundreds of trillions of 
connections to one another? Human behaviors are immensely complex, and each individual is 
exceedingly different. Evolution has imagined the brain as a structure stereotyped yet plastic, 
incredibly robust to the unique path navigated by an individual through the series of decisions that 
make up her life.  
When Nobel laureate Ramón y Cajal first began to consider the nervous system in the late 
nineteenth century, neuroscience was energized by a fierce debate over the nature of these cells, 
with some contending that they were part of a continuous mesh while others maintained that the 
cells were discrete units. Cajal’s exquisite drawings of the cells he imaged bolstered the argument 
of the latter camp, cementing the definition of the neuron as the fundamental unit of the nervous 
system. At the same time, a debate over the nature of the psyche raged in philosophy and, by 
extension, psychology. Functionalism, a theory espoused by William James, author of the seminal 
text Principles of Psychology, was in the process of supplanting the introspective psychology that 
had dominated previous theories of the mind. At its core, functionalism posited that mental states 
could be defined by their functional roles – their causal interactions with other components of the 
system, such as sensory inputs, other mental states, and behavioral output. In many ways, cognitive 
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neuroscience is the natural convergence of these theories. Cognitive neuroscientists look to the 
brain as the mediator between mind and behavior, localizing psychological processes to brain 
regions and neural networks. 
Cognitive neuroscience witnessed a revolution2 with Ogawa and colleagues’ discovery of the 
BOLD signal in 19903; inquisitive scientists were provided unparalleled access into the world of the 
behaving mind. Changes in the BOLD response are now imaged as individuals engage in actions 
that mirror the complexity of their everyday decisions. Neuroimaging studies of cognitive control 
have provided critical insight into the neurobiological mechanisms of some of the most pervasive 
actions in human life. Cognitive control processes – ranging from suppression of a motor action in 
response to an environmental change to self-regulation that sustains long-term wellness goals – 
allow individuals to do more than just respond reflexively to their immediate environment, enabling 
more complex behaviors directed by often-distant future goals4. Studying behaviors so fundamental 
to the human condition brings us ever closer to understanding how and why we do the things we do, 
questions that have long driven philosophical thought. Ramón y Cajal could hardly have imagined 
how close we could be to glimpsing those “mysterious butterflies of the soul.”  
Inhibition and cognitive control 
The ability to navigate a changing world requires the ability to detect such changes and adjust 
behavior accordingly. At the same time, the environment can remain unchanged for long periods of 
time, rendering active behavior adjustment unnecessarily costly and facilitating more automatic and 
efficient learned responses. Response inhibition, through suppression of inappropriate behaviors, 
enables optimal behaviors in this kind of unpredictable setting, and is a crucial component of 
cognitive control. 
 
  
13 
Research on the cognitive neuroscience of inhibition has been marked by disagreement over the 
meaning of the term. In neuroscience, the contextual meaning of inhibition is clear at multiple levels 
of analysis, as it is observable either in neurophysiological measures or in behavior. In psychology, 
inhibition is less clearly defined, and has been used to describe components of myriad processes5. 
Unsurprisingly, the marriage of neuroscience and psychology of inhibition lacks this kind of clarity, 
and studies of the neural underpinnings of inhibition and, more generally, cognitive control 
encompass many potentially distinct processes, spanning motor inhibition, attentional inhibition of 
distracting stimuli, emotion regulation, and self-control5. Despite this lack of clear 
operationalization, all these processes seem to involve a single substrate: a cognitive signal issued in 
response to an environmental change that has rendered current behavior sub-optimal. It is this 
constituent process that will be examined in this thesis. 
Because of its unique pattern of connectivity, which facilitates both internal links and external 
connections to other cortical regions and subcortical structures6-9, the PFC is well positioned to issue 
such a signal4,10,11. The vlPFC has been consistently implicated in response inhibition by lesion12 
and functional neuroimaging5,13-15 studies, and is thought to support response inhibition through 
maintenance of stimulus-response associations16,17. More dorsal regions of lateral PFC have also 
been implicated in the maintenance of information relevant to response selection18-20 and response 
inhibition21-23. Furthermore, apart from representing value (e.g., 24), the vmPFC/OFC may mediate 
the effects of emotion on response selection25-27. 
Activations in these prefrontocortical regions are reported by many neuroimaging studies of 
response inhibition28. The go/no-go task29, which measures ability to withhold a motor response, is 
perhaps the most prominent paradigm in this literature. Also common is the stop signal task, which 
measures a slightly different construct than the go/no-go paradigm: instead of merely examining 
  
14 
what is needed to withhold an action, the stop-signal task assays the ability to abort a prepared 
action that is no longer required30,31, and poor performance in this task is thought to reflect 
impulsivity32. Recent work33 suggests that the action cancelation needed to perform in the stop 
signal task is a late-emerging subcomponent of response inhibition. Importantly, while action 
withholding (as in go/no-go) begins earlier, both processes seem to engage the same network of 
fronto-parietal-pre-motor regions. 
Sebastian and colleagues’ findings33 align well with an influential neurocomputational model of 
action selection that maps onto the direct, indirect, and hyperdirect pathways from the cortex to the 
basal ganglia. In this model, the direct pathway facilitates the implementation of the appropriate 
action, while the indirect pathway suppresses any actions that are inappropriate given the current 
state; the hyperdirect pathway functions as a global inhibitor of action34-36. This so-called basal 
ganglia go/no-go (BG-GNG) model37 accounts for the balance of signaling between the direct (go), 
indirect (no-go), and hyperdirect (global no-go) pathways, providing a neuroanatomical38 and 
neurochemical (i.e., dopaminergic)39 basis for response inhibition. This model, which has been 
shown to provide a good fit for experimental data40-42, has also been used to examine aberrant 
response inhibition in the underlying cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuitry in disorders 
including Parkinson’s disease, Tourette’s syndrome, attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, drug 
addiction, and schizophrenia43. 
ITC as a model for self-control 
Studies of self-control have commonly defined self-control as a preference for larger, delayed 
relative to smaller, immediate rewards44-53. The tasks implemented in this paradigm involve ITCs, 
or decisions whose outcomes occur at some point in the future. Such decisions are ubiquitous 
outside the laboratory, and have important consequences for individuals as well as policy-making 
bodies54-57. 
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Temporal discounting is antithetical to this definition of self-control, and describes the opposite 
tendency to value immediate gains over future gains58,59; this phenomenon has been observed in a 
variety of species, including pigeons60-62, rats60,63, macaques64-66, and humans67-69. While multiple 
frameworks for ITC have been proposed70, two models are generally used to describe these 
behaviors. The first, which is based on the standard discounted utility model in economics71, 
assumes a constant rate of discounting over time. The second assumes a hyperbolic relationship 
between value and delay (to the reward)72 – meaning that discounting is steeper for values nearer in 
the future – and tends to provide a better fit for observed behavior54,73. 
As such, the hyperbolic discounting function is commonly used to model human choice data in 
neuroimaging studies. The work of Kable and Glimcher (2007) has been particularly influential, 
and provided the first fMRI evidence of the neural correlates of subjective desirability for choice 
preferences in intertemporal decision making74; they demonstrated that activity in ventral striatum, 
medial PFC – a region critical for valuation75 – and posterior cingulate track subjective value. 
Others have replicated and extended this work using a variety of methodological parameters70. 
Despite these advances, however, the neural circuitry mediating ITC remains poorly understood. 
Consistent with other theories of cognitive control (e.g., 10), the fronto-cortico-striatal circuitry is 
thought to be involved76-81. Human82 and non-human primate66,83,84 research has specifically 
implicated the dlPFC, which is thought to maintain context and goal information over time85-87 and 
has been shown to be important for self-control in dietary choice88,89. 
Individual differences in ITC 
Individuals vary widely in their ability to delay gratification49,59,90, and temporal discounting is 
thought to be another key correlate of trait impulsivity91-93. Because temporal discounting behavior 
is similar to the clinical phenomenology seen in disorders of impulse control, it has further been 
used to study impairment in conditions including substance abuse, pathological gambling, and 
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attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and may serve as an important target for therapeutic 
intervention28,94-97. Understanding the continuum of ITC behavior and its underlying neurobiology 
can therefore have significant implications for the treatment of psychological disorders. 
Theories addressing the psychological basis of temporal discounting have often dealt with varying 
conceptions of the self. Some44,52,53,72 have proposed that ITC can be thought of as “intrapersonal 
bargaining among multiple ‘selves’”98. In this model, an individual evaluates how outcomes will 
affect future selves relative to the present self; the distance between an individual and his or her 
future self – or, rather, the extent to which the future self is viewed as a distinct entity – is reflected 
in shortsighted decision making99,100. This theory is consistent with the idea that humans are 
particularly adept at “mental time travel”101, and that this ability to represent the future has played a 
direct role in human success as a species101,102. Specifically, the representation of future outcomes at 
the time of decision facilitates goal-directed planning that can help overcome a tendency for 
impulsive, myopic decision making shaped only by the demands of the moment. Indeed, vividness 
of representation of the future self is linked to mitigated temporal discounting55,103,104 and reduced 
delinquency105. 
Recent neuroimaging research has begun to characterize the role of self-referential processing and 
“mental time travel” on the neural correlates of temporal discounting. In 2011, Mitchell and others 
found evidence of decreased self-referential processing in vmPFC when short-sighted monetary 
decisions were made98. Two other recent studies have focused on the role of episodic imagery on 
discounting behavior. Peters and Büchel (2010) found that when ITCs were associated with cues to 
generate imagery, temporal discounting was reduced and neural response was enhanced in a 
network of regions implicated in episodic thinking, including medial PFC. Moreover, the strength 
of functional coupling between anterior cingulate cortex and subcortical regions predicted the extent 
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to which temporal discounting was attenuated77. Benoit and colleagues (2011) also cued specific 
episodic imagery during an ITC task and demonstrated strong, imagery-related medial PFC 
response in association with reduced temporal discounting106. A separate line of research has 
implicated the vmPFC in envisioning positive future events107, suggesting that emotional salience 
affects the vividness of imagery. 
Contributions of this thesis 
Increased experience with environmental stimuli facilitates the development of automaticity, 
leading to enhanced efficiency in both behavioral and neural responding. While the neural 
correlates of learning for frequent stimulus-response associations over time has been well 
described26, learning for infrequent stimuli – particularly if their appearance requires cognitive 
control – is less well understood. The work described in Chapter 2 examines whether learned 
automaticity in cognitive control behavior for such infrequent events is associated with concomitant 
changes in neural response.  
In Chapter 3, we interrogate the neurobiology of a more abstract form of cognitive control using an 
ITC task. We combine research on the neural correlates of self-control in dietary choice88,89 and ITC 
(especially 82) to test a neurocomputational model of self-control that posits that control is 
implemented through modulation of vmPFC by dlPFC. We apply this model further, examining the 
relationship between the strength of these connections and individual temporal discounting 
behavior. We examine another potential source of individual differences in ITC in Chapter 4, 
testing the hypothesis that behavioral variation in ITC is related to the ability to imagine and 
neurally represent rewards. 
These experiments provide new insight into the neuroscience of cognitive control, advancing 
understanding of the function of PFC, especially the dorsal and ventral aspects of lateral PFC, in 
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driving goal-directed behavior. Moreover, the research presented in this thesis underscores the 
importance of studying the neural basis of individual variation, demonstrating the inferential power 
of individual differences-based approaches. 
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    C h a p t e r  2
 
 
NEURAL CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH LEARNED COGNITIVE CONTROLÛ 
Learned automaticity allows organisms to take advantage of environmental stability, enabling the 
efficient deployment of well-learned responses to common stimuli. Nonetheless, organisms must be 
prepared for the occurrence of infrequent events, since optimal outcomes in new conditions may 
require the deployment cognitive control processes to affect a change in behavior. A growing 
literature suggests that cognitive control can also benefit from experience-dependent automaticity, 
yet the neural correlates supporting this effect remain unclear. We used fMRI to examine the neural 
correlates of learning associated with enhanced cognitive control ability over time in a speeded 
response inhibition task with motivationally salient incentives for performance, where trials 
requiring inhibition were relatively infrequent. We found both behavioral and neural evidence of 
automaticity in frequent trials, replicating and extending previous work. Moreover, our data show 
that performance improvements in infrequent trials requiring control are supported by concomitant 
neural changes, with the right vlPFC, a region thought to be necessary for response inhibition, 
demonstrating linear decreases in BOLD response over time. These findings are consistent with the 
theory that learning of promotes both behavioral and neural efficiency in both frequent and 
infrequent environmental conditions. 
Introduction 
A dynamic environment necessitates the ability to adapt one’s behavior to the demands of the 
situation. More often than not, however, the environment is relatively unchanging. During these 
stable periods, automaticity emerges; such automaticity may be adaptive, ensuring that responses to 
frequently occurring events are deployed efficiently and effectively108,109. Nonetheless, one must 
                                                      
Û Work done in collaboration with Antonio Rangel. 
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still be prepared to act appropriately should a rare, unexpected event take place. For example, 
suppose you have sleepily entered a hotel shower and turned the right knob on the faucet only to 
find that scalding hot water is released. Even though the vast majority of faucet knobs map cold 
water to the right – including the one you’re used to at home – you had still better be prepared to 
jump back to avoid a burn. Learning when to be prepared for such a behavioral change is equally 
important. The challenge, therefore, is to learn the appropriate balance between the efficiency of 
learned automaticity and vigilance, so that automatic responses can be inhibited should goals 
change.  
Effective response inhibition is critical to maintaining this balance. Functional neuroimaging studies 
have often utilized two paradigms, go/no-go and stop signal, to examine how the human brain 
accomplishes this cognitive process. The go/no-go task29 presents participants with a series of 
stimuli, most of which are ‘go’ cues, indicating that a response should be made as quickly as 
possible. Interspersed between ‘go’ stimuli are the less-frequent ‘no-go’ cues, which indicate that a 
response should be withheld. The number of errors made of on ‘no-go’ trials (i.e., ‘go’ing when no 
response should have been made) is the index of inhibitory control. The stop signal paradigm110 also 
creates a speeded environment for responding to a sequence of stimuli; in this task, however, an 
additional stimulus is presented after some short – and often variable – delay on a small fraction of 
trials. This stop signal indicates that a response should be withheld on the trial as well as the 
duration of the stopping process is the measure of inhibitory control for the task. While the 
inhibitory processes (i.e., responses to successful ‘no-go’ and ‘stop’ trials) examined in the two 
paradigms are not fully equivalent111-113, they do elicit similar neural responses, particularly in right 
vlPFC (e.g., 21,114-122). Other related paradigms have also provided insight into the neural 
architecture required to inhibit a response process that has already begun. Task switching 
paradigms123,124, which measure the “cost” of switching from one task to another by indexing the 
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additional time required125-127, and reversal learning tasks, which require the abandonment of a well-
learned response for a new one when stimulus-response contingencies reverse98,128,129, have also 
suggested a role for the vlPFC. Other regions implicated more generally in these tasks include the 
anterior cingulate cortex130-134 (ACC), vmPFC/OFC135,136, (medial) pre-supplementary motor 
area122,137-139 (preSMA), inferior parietal cortex15,130, posterior parietal cortex134,140, insula116,141,142, 
striatum98,138,142-144, and subthalamic nucleus/ventral tegmental area145,146 (STN/VTA). 
One important characteristic of such paradigms is the relative infrequency of events that require 
inhibition. Indeed, vlPFC147-150, OFC151,152, and striatum153,154 are also implicated in the detection of 
infrequent, yet salient targets. What remains unclear, however, is how the response in these regions 
and in this larger network for behavioral control changes with exposure to these infrequent events 
over time. Does automaticity develop in these regions as practice with cognitive control increases? 
Recent work from Chiu and colleagues (2012) has shown that practice with ‘no-go’ stimuli can lead 
to automaticity in suppressing the ‘go’ response (as measured by motor evoked potentials) for those 
events. Interestingly, this automatic inhibition effect “wears off” as performance asymptotes, 
ostensibly because less inhibitory control is needed, since an incorrect motor response is less likely 
to be triggered. The authors suggest that automatic response inhibition is facilitated by the 
formation and subsequent retrieval of stimulus-stop associations155. Such automatic activation of an 
inhibitory control network would be consistent, for example, with evidence showing that right 
vlPFC activity can be elicited by stimuli that were previously associated with stopping156. 
Nonetheless, the link between automaticity in these regions and learned success in response 
inhibition remains poorly defined.  
Here, we introduce a novel paradigm for the study of cognitive control in the face of an emergent 
automatic response. While undergoing functional neuroimaging, participants learned to rapidly 
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associate particular motor responses to different visual stimuli; the appearance of relatively 
infrequent cues signaled a reversal of the appropriate response to a particular visual stimulus.  In 
order to study how learning impacts both automaticity and cognitive control, we examined changes 
in response to frequent (i.e., most susceptible to automaticity) and infrequent (i.e., requiring control) 
cues over the course of several hundred trials. We hypothesized that (1) increasing experience with 
frequent trials will encourage automaticity, as evidenced through improved accuracy in these trials 
over time; (2) learning (as evidenced by changes over time in response) in frequent trials will 
engage regions associated with response automaticity, including premotor areas157,158; (3) correct 
responses to infrequent events will require cognitive control and will therefore necessitate the 
recruitment of brain areas that have been implicated in response inhibition and cognitive control, 
specifically vlPFC; and (4) in contrast to learning in frequent trials, learning in the context of 
increased experience with response inhibition in infrequent trials will be associated with changes in 
vlPFC or other regions involved in cognitive control. 
Methods 
Participants. 24 healthy, right-handed male individuals (age = 23 ± 4.0 years) completed the study. 
All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, no history of neurological, psychiatric, or 
metabolic illness, and were not taking any medications that interfere with the BOLD signal at the 
time of scanning. The institutional review board at the California Institute of Technology (Pasadena, 
CA) approved the study. 
Task. Upon arriving for the experiment, participants were shown four fractal cues (matched for 
visual complexity) and their associated behavioral responses (i.e., the association between a 
particular fractal and a left or right button press). They were allowed to study these relationships for 
as long as was necessary to feel comfortable with the associations (mean = 49.7 ± 30.9 s). The 
associations between cues and responses were randomized across participants. After studying the 
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responses associated with each cue, the participant was told that, most of the time, the fractal would 
have a white circle at its center (normal contingency, or normal, trials) and they should respond 
according to the associations they had just seen. Participants were also told that occasionally the 
fractal cue would have a white triangle at its center instead of the circle (reversed contingency, or 
reversal, trials). On these trials, participants were instructed to respond to the cue using the opposite 
hand. For example, if the normal response to the fractal (with the circle in the center) was a right 
thumb button press, a triangle in the center would instead cue a reversal trial and thus, a left thumb 
button press.  
Each trial was initiated by the appearance of one of the four fractals, with either a circle or triangle 
at its center. Each cue appeared onscreen for 600 ms, and participants were told that any response 
made outside this time period would be recorded as incorrect. A correct response resulted in a gain 
of one point, while an incorrect response resulted in the loss of a point. A feedback screen with a 
duration of 1 s indicated the outcome of the trial. Feedback was immediately followed by a fixation 
period, during which participants were instructed to attend to a white cross at the center of the 
screen. The duration of fixation varied between 3 and 7 s (mean 5 s). A single trial is diagrammed in 
Figure 2.1A and a sample sequence of trials is shown in Figure 2.1C. 
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Figure 2.1. Task design. A) Single-trial schematic. B) Graphic depicting temporal evolution of 
reversal trial probability. C) Sample sequence of events. 
The task was divided into four experimental runs, each comprised of 120 trials. Twenty percent of 
the trials were reversal trials (96 total). In order to solidify automatic responding to the fractal cues, 
the probability of the reversal event increased linearly over the first 120 trials to reach a stable, 
uniform probability of 20% over the last 360 trials (see Figure 2.1B). Participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible to each trial. Importantly, their payment outcome for 
the study was directly related to their performance on the task. At the end of the task, the total 
points earned over all 480 trials were summed and multiplied by a conversion factor of 0.05 to 
determine an individual’s dollar payout. (Complete task instructions are included in Appendix A.) 
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After finishing the experiment, all participants completed a battery of questionnaires designed to 
assess the effect of individual differences on the behavioral and neural responses to the task. The 
results of these analyses will be discussed in a separate manuscript. 
Error analysis. Two types of errors are possible on reversal trials: an error of commission, in which 
the response is consistent with that fractal’s associated response in normal contingency trials, or an 
error of omission, in which the participant failed to enter any response during the allotted time. 
Because participants rarely made this second type of error, all incorrect trials were binned together 
for subsequent analysis. Errors on reversal trials, therefore, serve as our index of inhibitory control. 
Moreover, since there were no behavioral differences in performance by fractal identity (normal 
contingency performance x fractal identity ANOVA, p > 0.05), trials were grouped by condition for 
all subsequent behavioral and neural analyses. (A subsequent, post hoc analysis revealed no 
significant effect of fractal identity on neural response to either normal contingency or reversal 
cues.) These and other behavioral analyses were done using the Statistics Toolbox in MATLAB 
(Version 8.0.0.783, The MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts). 
Imaging data acquisition. Whole-brain functional imaging data were collected using a Siemens 
(Erlangen, Germany) 3.0 Tesla Trio MRI scanner. Using an eight-channel, phased array head coil, 
we collected gradient echo, T2*-weighted EPI images with BOLD contrast. In order to optimize 
BOLD sensitivity, we used a tilted acquisition in an orientation 30o oblique to the anterior-posterior 
commissure line159. The imaging parameters were as follows: TR = 2750 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle 
= 80o; FOV = 192 mm; in-plane resolution = 3 mm x 3 mm; and 44 3 mm slices with interleaved, 
bottom-up acquisition. Each of the four experimental runs corresponded to a scanning session with 
304 EPI volumes. The first four volumes of each run were discarded to allow for sufficient time for 
the magnetic field to achieve steady-state magnetization. High-resolution, whole-brain, T1-
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weighted structural images (TR = 1500 ms; TE = 3.05 ms; flip angle = 10o; voxel resolution = 1 
mm3; single-shot, ascending acquisition) were also collected for each of the participants. These 
images were coregistered with the their respective EPI images to assist with the anatomical 
localization of the functional activations.  
fMRI data preprocessing and statistical analysis. Imaging data analysis was performed using 
SPM5 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). 
Preprocessing of functional data consisted of correction for slice-time acquisition, motion correction 
and realignment to the mean image, spatial normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute EPI 
template, and spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel with a full-width-half-maximum at 8 mm. 
Intensity filtering and high-pass temporal filtering (using a filter width of 128 s) were also applied 
to the data. All images were visualized using MRIcron software 
(http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron/). 
We estimated two GLMs of the BOLD responses with first-order autoregression and convolution of 
regressors of interest to the canonical form of the hemodynamic response. Model 1 included two 
regressors of interest to examine brain regions generally associated with the processing of the two 
trial types: (1) an indicator function for the onset of all normal contingency trials and (2) an 
indicator for the onset of all reversal trials; all events were of duration 0 s. (An alternate GLM using 
RT for the event duration and as a parametric modulator showed qualitatively the same results as 
Model 1 and hence the results from this alternative model are not presented in more detail.) Four 
session constants and six motion parameters were included as regressors of no interest. For each 
participant, we computed the following contrasts at the first level: all normal contingency trials > all 
reversal trials and its reverse, and, to examine possible learning, a linear increase over the four 
sessions for both normal and reversal trials (separately) as well as the concomitant linear decrease. 
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To test for linear effects over time, we specified first-level contrasts separately for both normal 
contingency and reversal trials of the form [-0.75 -0.25 0.25 0.75] to test for linear increases in 
response and [0.75 0.25 -0.25 -0.75] to test for linear decreases in response over the four runs. 
In order to address directly effects of performance on neural response for the two trial types, we 
estimated Model 2 with the following regressors of interest: (1) an indicator function for normal 
contingency trials where the correct response was entered (NormalCorrect, or NC), (2) an indicator 
for incorrect normal contingency trials (NormalIncorrect, or NI), (3) an indicator for correct reversal 
trials (ReversalCorrect, or RC), and (4) an indicator for incorrect reversal trials (ReversalIncorrect, 
or RI). All events were modeled with a duration of 0 s. Note that, as in the behavioral analysis, 
incorrect reversal trials were primarily errors of commission. The following first-level contrasts 
were computed for each individual: [NC - NI], [NI - NC], [RC-RI], [RI - RC], [NC - NI - RC + RI], 
[RC - RI - NC + NI], and [NC - NI + RC - RI]. (The final contrast identifies regions involved in 
processing correct responses relative to incorrect ones, while controlling for incorrect reversal 
responses, which were hypothesized to be similar to correct normal contingency responses.) 
For each model, we evaluated effects on the group level by computing one-sample t-tests on the 
single-subject contrasts. We corrected for multiple comparisons at the whole-brain cluster level 
(denoted subsequently by WBC), using an individual voxel threshold of p < 0.001. (The minimum 
cluster extent was determined by the model and specific contrast; these values are noted in the table 
legends.) For completeness, we also report any clusters with extent greater than 10 voxels. 
Furthermore, we used small volume correction (SVC) to examine a priori areas of interest. 
Specifically, we used WFU PickAtlas software160 (version 3.04) to create anatomically-defined 
masks 161 of the left and right vlPFC (Talairach Daemon label: “inferior frontal gyrus”).  
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Results 
Behavioral results. Across all trials, participants responded with significantly greater accuracy on 
normal contingency trials (mean fraction correct = 0.68 ± 0.12) compared to reversal trials (mean 
fraction correct = 0.31 ± 0.096; t23 = 12.4, p < 0.001). Incorrect responses in reversal trials were 
primarily the button presses typically associated with the fractal cue (i.e., in normal contingency 
trials; mean fraction correct = 0.74 ± 0.14) rather than errors of omission. Since trials were also 
classified as incorrect if responses were entered after 600 ms (i.e., the subject received negative 
feedback at the end of the trial), we examined the accuracy of the button presses entered after the 
600 ms period. For both trial types, performance was improved slightly for responses entered during 
the requisite window (normal: mean fraction correct = 0.80 ± 0.111; reversal: mean fraction correct 
= 0.56 ± 0.21), indicating that a longer response window would have improved accuracy.  
We hypothesized that increasing experience with frequent trials would lead to automaticity, and we 
tested for improved accuracy as evidence of such an effect. We computed a 2x4 ANOVA where the 
within-subjects factors were task condition (normal or reversal) and time (i.e., run 1-4). Specifically, 
we were interested in possible learning of stimulus-response relationships over time, and whether 
this learning differed by condition. While main effects of condition (F1,184 = 437, p < 0.001) and 
time (F3,184 = 4.89, p < 0.005) were found, there was no significant interaction between the factors. 
These findings indicate that participants were more accurate for normal trials than reversal trials, 
and that their performance in both frequent and infrequent trials improved over the course of the 
experiment, with no interaction between conditions (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2. Behavioral performance by condition across time. Rightmost panel shows 
performance averaged across all four runs. 
A post hoc examination verified a significant linear trend over time for both normal trial (t23 = 2.78, 
p < 0.05) and reversal trial accuracy (t1,23 = 4.62, p < 0.001).  
To further examine evidence for automaticity, we also analyzed the relationships between reaction 
time (RT) and condition, accuracy, and time. Using log-transformed RT values, we computed a 
2x2x4 ANOVA where the factors were condition (normal or reversal), performance (correct or 
incorrect), and time (i.e., run 1-4). The analysis revealed main effects of condition (F1,367 = 26.5, p < 
0.001) and performance (F1,367 = 6.97, p < 0.01), but not time (p = 0.98); none of the interaction 
terms were statistically significant (p > 0.05); in summary, normal contingency trials were 
associated with comparatively shorter response latencies and RTs were longer for correct compared 
to incorrect trials.  
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Figure 2.3. Reaction time by performance across conditions. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the reaction times over all trials for correct and incorrect trials in both 
conditions; values are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Performance 
Correct Incorrect 
Condition 
Normal 0.474 ± 0.035 0.454 ± 0.039 
Reversal 0.497 ± 0.043 0.487 ± 0.037 
 
Table 2.1. Mean reaction time by condition and performance. Mean (s) ± standard deviation. 
Neuroimaging results. Model 1 tested for differences in neural response to normal contingency and 
reversal trials. As visualized in Figure 2.4, compared to reversal trials, normal contingency trials 
showed stronger BOLD response in vmPFC (including subgenual ACC and OFC), left superior 
temporal gyrus, and right insula extending into the putamen (p < 0.05, WBC; Table 2.2).  
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Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Right insula, putamen 740  33 -12 -6 5.23* 
Left superior temporal gyrus 570 42 -63 -3 18 5.03* 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 337 25/11 3 18 -12 4.79* 
Left putamen 69  -24 -3 -9 4.26 
Left cuneus 35 19 -6 -93 33 4.09 
Right postcentral gyrus 125 5/7 18 -54 63 3.90 
Right anterior caudate 23  21 36 -3 3.90 
Left caudate 31  -18 21 15 3.89 
Right caudate 27  18 21 15 3.87 
Posterior cingulate gyrus 24 31 -9 -18 51 3.83 
Right middle occipital gyrus, cuneus 33 18/19 15 -93 33 3.78 
Right cuneus 31 17 24 -90 15 3.76 
Left precuneus 36 5 -18 -45 63 3.59 
Left postcentral gyrus 11 3 -45 -27 60 3.28 
              
 
Table 2.2. Regions showing greater response for normal contingency compared to reversal trials. 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 194 voxels).  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
 
Figure 2.4. Voxels showing differential effects by condition. The warm color scale reflects 
regions more active for normal contingency than reversal trials, while the cool color scale reflects 
regions more active for the opposite contrast, reversal > normal. 
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In contrast, stronger response in reversal trials was observed in a large cluster encompassing medial 
preSMA, bilateral ventrolateral, right insular, and left insular cortices (including left vlPFC). Other 
regions demonstrating higher neural response for reversal compared to normal contingency trials 
included bilateral inferior parietal lobule, bilateral precuneus, left fusiform gyrus, and midbrain (p < 
0.05, WBC; Table 2.3). 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Medial pre-supplementary motor area,  5004 6/8/9/10/47 0 24 48 6.89* 
bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex       
bilateral anterior insula, bilateral        
        ventrolateral prefrontal cortex       
Left inferior parietal lobule, precuneus 1192 40/7 -30 -51 45 6.54* 
Right inferior parietal lobule, precuneus 1564 40/7 42 -54 48 6.45* 
Left fusiform gyrus 535 37 -42 -60 -12 5.83* 
Midbrain 251  6 -24 -3 5.61* 
Right fusiform gyrus, parahippocampal     73 20/36 30 -33 -24 5.08 
         gyrus       
Right cerebellum 24  12 -75 -30 4.47 
Posterior cingulate cortex 83 23 3 -24 30 4.33 
Right lateral prefrontal cortex 18 10 36 51 18 4.23 
Left caudate 17  -12 3 6 3.70 
Right caudate 12  12 3 15 3.64 
              
 
Table 2.3. Regions showing greater response for reversal compared to normal contingency trials.  
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 194 voxels).  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
In order to test our second hypothesis, that learning in both frequent and infrequent trials will 
engage brain regions associated with response automaticity, we also evaluated Model 1 for linear 
changes in neural response over time.  
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Figure 2.5. Voxels showing linear effects of time for each condition. A) Regions showing a 
positive linear effect in normal contingency trials. B) Regions showing a negative linear effect in 
reversal trials. The warm color scale reflects linear increases in response over time, while the cool 
color scale reflects linear decreases in response over time.  
Neural response to normal trials increased over time in many areas, including right caudate and 
right cerebellum (p < 0.05, WBC), as well as vmPFC and PCC (p < 0.001, uncorrected; Figure 
2.5A); no regions showed significant linear decreases in response over the runs during normal 
contingency trials (Table 2.4). 
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Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Left angular gyrus, precuneus 156 39/19 -42 -81 36 4.73 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 42 9 15 36 33 4.63 
Right cerebellum 220  39 -45 -36 4.54* 
Left premotor cortex 155 6/8 -12 30 63 4.41 
Right inferior temporal gyrus 30 20 57 -6 -27 4.37 
Left cerebellum 128  -27 -72 -39 4.34 
Right premotor cortex 29 8 27 42 51 4.30 
Left caudate 68  -18 27 9 4.29 
Right precentral gyrus 50 4 15 -24 54 4.28 
Precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex 166 23/31 3 -54 24 4.36 
Right caudate 194  24 33 3 4.22* 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 127 10/11 -3 42 -6 4.05 
Left posterior insula 55 13 -39 -48 21 4.02 
Left precuneus 14 7 -15 -57 39 3.96 
Left lingual gyrus, fusiform gyrus 44 18/19 -6 -81 -6 3.93 
Right fusiform gyrus 19 18 27 -72 -12 3.79 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 121 10 -12 60 24 3.77 
Left lateral prefrontal cortex 11 10 -30 57 6 3.76 
Subgenual anterior cingulate cortex 12 25 3 15 -18 3.74 
Right angular gyrus 19 39 54 -72 36 3.72 
Left inferior temporal, middle temporal gyri 46 20/21 -57 -3 -27 3.69 
Medial prefrontal cortex 33 10 -6 54 12 3.67 
Posterior cingulate cortex 19 30 -21 -57 9 3.66 
Right premotor cortex 13 6 12 27 63 3.66 
Left putamen 40  -21 6 -3 3.64 
Right superior frontal gyrus 29 10 21 51 33 3.58 
Right insula 15 13 51 -15 9 3.51 
Left cerebellum 16  -42 -51 -30 3.46 
Left amygdala 12  -18 -6 -18 3.46 
Left inferior frontal gyrus 16 47 -48 45 -3 3.45 
Left extrastriate cortex 18 18 -12 -99 3 3.42 
              
 
Table 2.4. Regions showing positive linear effects of time in normal contingency trials 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 174 voxels). 
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
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In contrast, only a negative linear effect was evident in reversal trials, with premotor cortex and 
right lateral PFC extending into insula showing particularly strong decreases in neural response over 
time (p < 0.05, WBC; Figure 2.5B, Table 2.5). 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Right middle frontal gyrus 381 6 39 3 57 4.53* 
Retrosplenial cortex 31 29 6 -39 6 4.53 
Right lateral prefrontal cortex,      323 45 51 24 30 4.52* 
        anterior insula       
Right inferior parietal lobule 141 40 36 -51 42 4.31 
Left anterior insula 107  -42 18 -9 4.25 
Premotor cortex 63 6/8 0 27 51 3.95 
Left inferior parietal lobule 16 40 -30 -60 39 3.74 
Right middle temporal gyrus 15 21 51 -9 -15 3.61 
Left lateral prefrontal cortex 14 46 -48 21 30 3.52 
              
  
Table 2.5. Regions showing negative linear effects of time in reversal trials. 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 173 voxels).  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
Direct contrasts between normal and reversal for both the positive linear and negative linear effects 
confirmed that changes over time were unique to each condition (all p < 0.01, uncorrected). 
With Model 2, we tested for effects of response accuracy. In Normal trials, correct compared to 
incorrect responses were associated with particularly heightened BOLD signal in PCC extending 
through striatum and into vmPFC/OFC, primary visual and extrastriate cortices, and right premotor 
areas (p < 0.05, WBC). The reverse contrast showed greater activations in medial preSMA 
extending into right supplementary motor cortex (p < 0.05, WBC), as well as bilateral anterior 
insula and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (p < 0.001, uncorrected; Figure 2.6, Table 2.6). 
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Figure 2.6. Neural main effects of accuracy in normal contingency trials. The warm color scale 
reflects regions more active for correct trials, while the cool color scale reflects regions more 
active for the incorrect trials. 
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Contrast Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
NC - NI        
 Posterior cingulate cortex, striatum,  3768 31 3 -42 36 5.28* 
        ventromedial prefrontal cortex       
 Left premotor cortex 261 8/6 -18 30 54 5.27 
 Right extrastriate cortex, cuneus,  293 18 27 -96 9 5.17* 
        lingual gyrus       
 Left primary visual cortex 275 17 -21 -96 6 4.55* 
 Left precuneus, angular gyrus 62 39 -36 -66 30 4.32 
 Right superior temporal gyrus 36 22 57 -9 -3 4.30 
 Right premotor cortex 280 8/6 24 24 57 4.24* 
 Right inferior temporal gyrus 67 20 60 -9 -24 4.10 
 Left hippocampus 27  -30 -33 -3 4.00 
 Left superior temporal gyrus 18 22 -54 -9 -3 3.98 
 Right angular gyrus 32 39 48 -72 36 3.84 
 Left middle temporal gyrus 16 41 -54 -45 -9 3.59 
 Dorsomedial cingulate cortex 13 32 3 -9 30 3.39 
        
NI - NC       
 
 Left anterior insula 229  -33 21 9 5.39 
 Right anterior insula 190  36 18 9 4.64 
 
Medial premotor cortex, right 
supplementary motor cortex 299 32/6 6 15 42 4.40* 
 Right supramarginal gyrus 75 40 63 -45 27 4.31 
 Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 46 9 42 6 33 4.15 
 Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 42 9 -42 15 33 4.00 
 Left superior parietal lobule 29 7 -27 -60 42 3.75 
 Precuneus 23 31 -9 -69 18 3.64 
 Left supplementary motor cortex 17 6 -9 -9 72 3.64 
 Right parahippocampal gyrus 10 30 18 -54 0 3.37 
 Left parahippocampal gyrus 11 30 -18 -60 0 3.33 
                
 
Table 2.6. Regions showing differential effects for correct and incorrect normal trials. 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 257 voxels).  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
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We examined our third hypothesis by testing specifically for the involvement of cognitive control 
regions in trials for correct reversal responses. Significant effects for reversal trials were only found 
for correct > incorrect trials; correct responses in these trials were associated with activity in right 
supplementary motor areas (p < 0.05, WBC) and left vlPFC (p < 0.05, SVC), among others (Figure 
2.7, Table 2.7).  
 
Figure 2.7. Voxels more active in correct reversal trials. 
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Contrast Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
RC - RI        
 Right supplementary motor cortex 333 6/8 21 24 63 4.72* 
 Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 127 11 -42 42 -9 4.64 
 Right angular gyrus 138 7/40 51 -63 51 4.49 
 Left supplementary motor cortex 121 6 -30 18 60 4.46 
 Left ventral striatum 98  -12 6 -9 4.42 
 Left angular gyrus 50 7 -39 -72 45 4.08 
 Left anterior insula 28  -36 15 -6 3.88 
 Anterior cingular gyrus 36 32 3 39 -3 3.87 
 Right anterior insula 57  45 30 -9 3.74 
 Medial prefrontal cortex 141 10 0 57 21 3.56 
 Left fusiform gyrus 26 20 -51 -39 -27 3.46 
        
RI - RC        
 No significant voxels       
                
 
Table 2.7. Regions showing differential effects for correct and incorrect reversal trials.  
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 205 voxels).  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
For completeness, we also examined differences between correct and incorrect responses while 
accounting for condition. We computed the contrast [NC - NI - RC + RI], which showed 
differences between normal contingency and reversal trials for correct compared to incorrect. 
Increased neural activity was observed in regions including subgenual ACC and bilateral posterior 
insula; subcortically, greater responses were seen in left hippocampus and bilateral caudate (p < 
0.001, uncorrected; Figure S2.1, Table S2.1). The reverse contrast, [RC - RI - NC + NI], showed 
more robust effects, with enhanced responses in regions including premotor cortex and bilateral 
insula (p < 0.05, WBC; Figure S2.2, Table S2.2). Finally, we examined the contrast [NC - NI + RC 
- RI]; this contrast examined differential effects for correct and incorrect trials by condition while 
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controlling for incorrect responses on reversal trials, since those responses required the same motor 
action as the correct normal contingency response. Stronger BOLD response was observed in 
bilateral premotor areas, PCC, and ventral striatum extending into medial PFC (p < 0.05, WBC; 
Figure S2.3, Table S2.3). 
Finally, to interrogate our fourth hypothesis, we examined linear changes in response – particularly 
in infrequent (i.e., reversal) trials – over time with respect to performance. For correct reversal 
trials, we saw decreases in response over time in a variety of regions, including medial preSMA, left 
and right vlPFC, right lateral PFC, and right inferior parietal lobule (p < 0.05, WBC; Figure 2.8, 
Table 2.8). No regions showed increase response over time for correct reversal trials. All other 
results showing linear changes in neural response as a function of response accuracy are described 
in Supplementary Materials (incorrect reversal trials: Figure S2.4 and Table S2.4 correct normal 
trials: Figure S2.5 and Table S2.5; incorrect normal contingency trials: Figure S2.6 and Table S2.6). 
 
Figure 2.8. Voxels showing negative linear effects of time in correct reversal trials. 
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Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Premotor cortex 351 6/8 3 36 45 4.69* 
Right lateral prefrontal cortex 53 10 24 48 21 4.58* 
Right inferior parietal lobule, angular gyrus 180 39/40 45 -54 45 4.33* 
Right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, 
anterior insula 162 11/47 45 30 -6 4.23* 
Right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 101 45/46 42 21 27 4.17* 
Right middle temporal gyrus 34 21 69 -27 -6 4.07 
Posterior cingulate cortex 17 29 6 -42 6 3.98 
Right middle frontal gyrus 72 6 42 12 51 3.94* 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, anterior 
insula 116 47 -48 21 -6 3.93* 
Left angular gyrus, inferior parietal lobule 107 40 -51 -57 39 3.91* 
Precuneus 12 7 -9 -63 20 3.82 
Left middle temporal gyrus 25 21 -45 51 0 3.62 
Left precentral gyrus 10 3 -33 9 33 3.55 
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 18 46 -48 21 33 3.53 
              
 
Table 2.8. Regions showing negative linear effects of time in correct reversal trials. 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 42 voxels).  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, we investigated the relationship between response automaticity and cognitive 
control ability in a motivationally salient response inhibition task using fMRI. As participants 
developed experience with the task over time, their responses to both frequent and infrequent trials 
became more highly learned, as reflected by linear increases in performance over experimental 
sessions. These behavioral effects were reflected in concomitant linear changes in neural response 
in regions that have been implicated in response automaticity, including caudate (e.g., 162,163) and 
cerebellum (e.g., 164) for normal trials, and preSMA158,165,166 for reversal trials. Neural responses 
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were further modulated by performance, where an effect of automaticity was observed in regions 
including right vlPFC – an area thought to be necessary for cognitive control12 – only in trials where 
response inhibition was implemented successfully. These findings replicate and extend previous 
work identifying neural regions involved in cognitive control and response automaticity, and 
provide additional support for the theory that automaticity in cognitive control is associated with 
neural efficiency. 
Neural main effects of task condition (Model 1) suggest that our task engaged brain regions that 
have been implicated by previous research on response inhibition and cognitive control. Compared 
to normal trials, reversal trials produced increases in activity in a wide variety of regions, including 
anterior insula, which may be involved in representing the physiological state associated with 
obtaining a motivationally salient outcome167,168, bilateral vlPFC, which is linked to inhibitory 
control (e.g., 127,129,135), and preSMA, which may facilitate the switch from controlled to automatic 
responding157. Additional regions identified include the bilateral inferior parietal lobule, which is 
thought to be involved in sensorimotor integration169, and midbrain, which may reflect 
dopaminergic signaling from STN/VTA for response inhibition145,146. Separating these trials by 
performance (Model 2) provides additional insight into the neural processes underlying response 
inhibition. Compared to incorrect trials, correct reversal trials elicited responses in the 
supplementary motor cortex, potentially reflecting signals related to updated stimulus-response 
value98 and also left vlPFC, which has been implicated in the maintenance of goals and sets141. 
While response inhibition has most consistently been linked to right vlPFC, the left vlPFC has also 
been identified in such tasks. Functional imaging studies with go/no-go and stop signal tasks (e.g., 
117,120,170), as well as task switching paradigms (e.g., 171,172), have described bilateral activations of 
vlPFC. Possible laterality effects have not yet been fully characterized, but one suggestion is that 
the activation of either or both hemispheres is largely task-dependent13. 
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Learned automaticity in neural response to reversal trials was evidenced by a decrease in BOLD 
response over time in premotor cortex and right vlPFC extending into insula; no regions showed a 
linear increase in signal over sessions. This effect was unique to reversal trials, since there were no 
common activations for temporal response patterns between normal and reversal trials. Moreover, 
as experience with cognitive control increased over time, correct responses were associated with 
reductions in neural response in several regions that have been linked to cognitive control, including 
medial preSMA122,137-139,157, right vlPFC (e.g., 21,98,114-122,126-129), right lateral PFC98,114, and right 
inferior parietal cortex15,130. These data are in line with the work of Chiu and others (2012), who 
demonstrated that the magnitude of motor evoked potentials decreases as performance improves in 
the ‘no-go’ trials of a typical go/no-go paradigm155, and extend their work to fMRI, which offers 
more precise localization of effects. Reductions in neural response in association with training and 
improvement in individual performance may be indicative of increased efficiency, especially in 
cognitive tasks (e.g., 164,173-176). Together, such data imply that the cognitive control performance 
enhancements associated with increased automaticity may be mediated by increased neural 
efficiency. 
Nonetheless, these neural data only provide correlative evidence for automaticity. Learning in this 
study was measured by improvements in response accuracy over time. We had expected that 
automaticity would also be manifest in RT, where correct responses would be associated with 
shorter response latencies as performance improved. While we did observe significant effects of 
condition, with normal trials having longer response latencies than reversal trials, and accuracy, 
where correct trials requiring longer response latencies than incorrect trials, we did not see an 
interaction between conditions or an effect of time. One possible reason for this finding is that the 
cognitive effort required for the two conditions was apparently similar enough that the largest 
difference in average RT was on the order of 23 ms. Moreover, across the runs, average reaction 
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time was relatively unchanged, and changes were only evident in slight reductions in standard 
deviation, particularly between the first and second half of the experiment. Even as improvements 
in accuracy indicated learning over time, the task remained difficult – the highest average 
performance (in run 4) for normal contingency was 71.4% and 35.7% for reversal trials – and 
required vigilance for the duration of the experiment.  
Several additional issues should be considered in the interpretation of these findings. First, with 
respect to the role of vlPFC in response inhibition, recent data have suggested that right vlPFC 
activation in go/no-go tasks may reflect a more general attentional salience detection 
mechanism148,177. Neither our experiment nor any of the others cited here can fully rule out this 
interpretation, since response inhibition tasks typically make use of “oddball” style designs, where 
the stimuli requiring control are far less frequent than the other stimuli, enhancing their novelty or 
salience. However, it is worth noting that lesions to frontal areas, including the vlPFC, critically 
affect performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, a neuropsychological battery that, like 
many other task switching paradigms, measures behavioral flexibility in response to changing 
reinforcement schedules178,179. 
A second potential concern for analysis of data from experiments like this one where the frequency 
of event types is unbalanced (i.e., normal contingency versus reversal) is relative statistical power 
for parameter estimation. This issue is of particular importance for the interpretation of Model 2 
results, since correct and incorrect reversal events were modeled separately in this GLM; wide 
variation in performance across individuals – for all 96 reversal trials, there was an order or 
magnitude difference in response accuracy (minimum percent correct = 5.21%; maximum percent 
correct = 52.1%) across participants – resulted in conditions where parameter estimates for some 
participants were much better than for others.  
  
45 
Another source of individual variability was task in strategy180 – for example, whether to strive for 
speed or accuracy; such differences manifest in both brain and behavior and can impact 
interpretation. While we cannot know whether individuals were more motivated by speed or 
accuracy strategies, we can assume that strategic bias was minimized by the experimental design, 
which provided both speed and accuracy incentives. We limited the response period to 600 ms, 
since a short response period has also been shown to increase the likelihood of observing response 
inhibition181 and is less likely than a long window to induce bias toward accuracy, since time for the 
evolution of cognitive processes is limited. We balanced any potential speed bias by providing 
motivationally salient feedback on each trial, a technique that has been shown to impact go/no-go 
learning both behaviorally and neurally in STN/VTA and vlPFC182. Indeed, our behavioral data 
indicate that we were able to mitigate any potential strategic bias; standard deviations were of 
comparable magnitude across normal and reversal trials, indicating that the speed incentive did not 
affect learning differentially during reversal trials. Moreover, when participants entered responses 
outside the 600 ms window on reversal trials, these responses were generally accurate, suggesting 
strong motivation to enter a correct response on each trial; additionally, post-task self-report 
suggested that participants were motivated by the feedback, and individuals were especially 
frustrated when they made errors of commission on reversal trials. 
A fourth caveat is in the psychological interpretation of results from incorrect reversal trials. The 
experimental response parameters limited the possible error types to errors of commission and 
omission. An error in a reversal trial could either be the same as a correct normal response for that 
particular fractal (error of commission) or a miss (error of omission).  However, since there were 
only two possible responses – a right or a left button press – to any given stimulus, it cannot be 
concluded that an error of commission was strictly due to interference from automaticity in normal 
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contingency trials. In order to remove this confound, future studies should include more possible 
error types. 
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Figure S2.1. Voxels showing differences for normal contingency and reversal trials when 
controlling for performance. 
 
The warm color scale reflects regions more active for the contrast [NC - NI - RC + RI], while the 
cool color scale reflects regions more active for the opposite contrast, [RC - RI - NC + NI]. 
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Table S2.1. Regions activated for the contrast [NC - NI - RC + RI]. 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Right superior temporal gyrus 114 42 63 -24 6 4.50 
Right paracentral lobule 44 5 12 -36 57 4.44 
Right subgenual cingulate cortex 25 25 15 30 -6 4.42 
Right caudate 20  21 3 30 4.24 
Subgenual cingulate cortex 17 25 -3 24 -15 4.21 
Left posterior insula 31 13 -27 -36 18 4.16 
Left caudate 20  -21 15 24 4.02 
Right postcentral gyrus 25 5 21 -42 63 3.94 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 65 11 -3 45 -12 3.93 
Right posterior insula 19 13 27 -27 24 3.93 
Left hippocampus 15  -27 -27 -3 3.68 
Right extrastriate cortex 19 18 24 -96 -3 3.45 
              
 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space.  
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 Figure S2.2. Voxels significantly activated for the contrast [RC - RI - NC + NI]. 
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Table S2.2. Regions activated for the contrast [RC - RI - NC + NI]. 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Left insula 276 13 -33 21 6 5.30* 
Premotor cortex 266 6/8 6 15 63 5.07* 
Right insula 313 13 36 24 -3 4.54* 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 19 11 -42 42 -6 3.91 
Left precentral gyrus 15 9 -57 12 42 3.88 
Left superior parietal lobule 29 7 -30 -60 45 3.78 
Right supramarginal gyrus 22 40 63 -57 39 3.57 
Left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 29 46 -48 21 24 3.49 
              
 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels. 
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 183 voxels). 
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space.  
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Figure S2.3. Voxels activated for the contrast [NC - NI + RC + RI]. 
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Table S2.3. Regions activated for the contrast [NC - NI + RC + RI]. 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Left premotor cortex 394 6/8 -24 21 66 5.15* 
Right premotor cortex 372 6/8 21 24 63 5.05* 
Posterior cingulate cortex 310 31 -3 -48 33 5.07* 
Ventral striatum, medial prefrontal cortex 1547 32/9/10 -15 9 -9 4.68* 
Right visual cortex 126 18/17 24 -93 3 4.63 
Right inferior parietal lobule 196 7/40 57 -63 45 4.49 
Left inferior parietal lobule 83 7/39/40 -39 -72 45 4.28 
Right inferior temporal gyrus 60 21 57 -9 -21 4.12 
Left cuneus 45 17 -18 -93 0 4.09 
Mediodorsal cingulate gyrus 94 24 -12 -12 33 3.96 
Left inferior temporal gyrus 106 20/21 -60 -36 -18 3.92 
Right cerebellum 10  42 -63 -42 3.90 
Left inferior frontal gyrus 13 47 -45 36 6 3.76 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 59 11 -39 45 -6 3.59 
Left lateral prefrontal cortex 13 10 -33 54 9 3.41 
              
 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels. 
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 243 voxels). 
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
 
  
53 
Figure S2.4. Voxels showing linear effects of time for incorrect reversal trials. 
 
The warm color scale indicates positive linear effects, while the cool color scale reflects negative 
linear effects.  
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Table S2.4. Regions exhibiting linear change in response over time for incorrect reversal trials. 
Contrast Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Linear increase 
over runs        
 Right cerebellum 23  36 -42 -36 4.33 
 Right paracentral lobule 11 31 15 -24 54 4.17 
 Right extrastriate cortex 41 18 12 -102 15 3.84 
 Right cingulate gyrus 12 24 21 9 33 3.47 
        
Linear 
decrease over 
runs        
 Left anterior insula 36 47 -42 18 -9 4.26 
 Right fusiform gyrus 11 37 51 -51 -21 3.68 
 Right superior temporal gyrus 11 22 51 -39 12 3.59 
 Right supramarginal gyrus 11 40 45 -51 36 3.42 
                
 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels. 
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space.  
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Figure S2.5. Voxels showing a linear increase in activation for correct normal contingency trials 
over time. 
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Table S2.5. Regions exhibiting linear increase in response over time for correct normal 
contingency trials. 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Premotor cortex 471 6/9/10 -12 30 63 4.61* 
Left angular gyrus, inferior parietal lobule 138 39 -42 -81 36 4.57* 
Right cerebellum 217  39 -51 -45 4.51* 
Frontal lobe (white matter) 107  24 21 27 4.45* 
Left superior temporal gyrus 35 39 -39 -48 21 4.29 
Right middle temporal gyrus 26 20/21 57 -6 -27 4.21 
Right superior frontal gyrus 35 8 24 42 51 4.2 
Left cerebellum 103  -24 -75 -36 4.05* 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 52 47/11 -48 30 -3 4.02* 
Left middle temporal gyrus 56 21 -60 -36 -3 3.91* 
Right superior frontal gyrus 90 9/10 21 51 36 3.87* 
Left lingual gyrus 32 18 -9 -81 -6 3.85 
Posterior cingulate cortex 94 31 0 -57 18 3.83* 
Frontal lobe (white matter) 10  -15 12 24 3.81 
Right supplementary motor area 15 6 24 -21 54 3.73 
Left supplementary motor area 11 6 -3 12 72 3.73 
Left supramarginal gyrus 33 40 -63 -48 42 3.69 
Left putamen 11  -21 3 12 3.65 
Right angular gyrus 16 39 54 -72 36 3.63 
Left hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus 20  -21 -12 -15 3.61 
Left precuneus 10 7 -18 -57 39 3.6 
Right putamen 14  21 9 9 3.59 
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex 82 10/11 3 42 -15 3.58* 
Left superior frontal gyrus 12 8 -33 24 48 3.42 
Left extrastriate cortex 17 18 -12 99 9 3.41 
Left cerebellum 20  -39 -54 -30 3.37 
              
 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels. 
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 45 voxels). 
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
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Figure S2.6. Voxels showing a linear increase in activation for incorrect normal contingency 
trials over time.  
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Table S2.6. Regions exhibiting linear increase in response over time for incorrect normal 
contingency trials. 
Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Right cerebellum 39  39 -45 -36 4.78 
Left lingual gyrus 11 30 -15 -42 0 4.72 
Left cerebellum 42  -45 -51 -33 4.54 
Posterior cingulate cortex 137 23/31 0 39 33 4.41* 
Left cerebellum 25  -27 -72 -39 3.93 
Left middle temporal gyrus 18 21 -42 0 -30 3.86 
Left precuneus 33 19 -42 -78 36 3.77 
Pons 10  3 -27 -39 3.75 
Right supplementary motor area 18 6 21 -24 54 3.62 
Posterior cingulate cortex 11 30 -18 -54 9 3.52 
Left cerebellum 19  -18 -63 -33 3.47 
              
 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels. 
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 45 voxels). 
k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
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   C h a p t e r  3
 
 
INTRA-PREFRONTOCORTICAL CONNECTIVITY IN TEMPORAL 
DISCOUNTINGÛ  
There is widespread interest in identifying computational and neurobiological mechanisms that 
influence the ability to choose long-term benefits over more proximal and readily available rewards 
in domains such as dietary and economic choice. We present the results of a human fMRI study that 
examines how neural activity relates to observed individual differences in the discounting of future 
rewards during a monetary ITC task. We found that portions of left dlPFC, in BA 9 and 46, were 
more active in trials where subjects chose delayed rewards, after controlling for the subjective value 
of those rewards. We also found that the connectivity from dlPFC-BA46 to a region of vmPFC 
widely associated with the computational of stimulus values, increased at the time of choice, and 
especially during trials in which subjects chose delayed rewards. Finally, we found that estimates of 
effective connectivity between these two regions played a critical role in predicting out-of-sample 
between-subject differences in discount rates. Together with previous findings in dietary choice, 
these results suggest that a common set of computational and neurobiological mechanisms facilitate 
virtuous choice in both settings. 
Introduction 
Impaired self-control is thought to play a critical role in sub-optimal decision-making, and in 
conditions like addiction and obesity28,97. As a result, there is a widespread, on-going effort to 
characterize the computational and neurobiological mechanisms underlying self-control. Two types 
of paradigms have been widely used in behavioral neuroscience to examine these mechanisms. First 
are tasks involving intertemporal decisions between rewards, often money, in which subjects choose 
between sooner-smaller amounts and later-larger ones70,74,76,77,79-81,97,183,184. Second, are tasks 
                                                      
Û Work done in collaboration with Todd Hare and Antonio Rangel. 
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involving dietary choices, in which subjects make choices between foods that vary in their tastiness 
and healthiness88,89,185.  
In previous work investigating dietary self-control, we found important commonalities and 
differences between successful and unsuccessful dieters88. Behaviorally, the two groups differed on 
the relative weight that they placed on the health and taste attributes of foods in making their 
decisions (with successful dieters weighting both health and taste, and unsuccessful dieters 
weighting only taste). Neurally, the vmPFC encoded the value of foods at the time of choice equally 
for both groups. The critical difference had to do with the role of left dlPFC. In successful dieters, 
dlPFC came on-line and exhibited increased effective connectivity with vmPFC during choices that 
required self-control (e.g., refusing to eat tasty, but unhealthy, candy). In contrast, unsuccessful 
dieters did not exhibit this pattern of connectivity. Furthermore, in a subsequent study we found that 
non-dieting participants behaved like successful dieters if they were given an exogenous reminder 
to pay attention to health information, and that the reminder activated the same dlPFC-vmPFC 
networks that successful dieters activated on their own89. 
These findings led us to propose the following model of the computational and neurobiological 
processes at work in self-control88,89,186. In the model, the vmPFC computes the value of options at 
the time of decision, by first assessing their various attributes, and then integrating them into a net 
value for the option as a whole. Importantly, “basic” attributes like tastiness might always be 
represented in the final value. However, more abstract attributes like healthiness are only 
represented, or are represented more strongly, if the dlPFC comes online and modulates activity in 
vmPFC, directing its value computations to incorporate them. This modulation is critical for 
optimal decision-making, because if some of the attributes are not represented or weighted properly, 
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the vmPFC will assign values to options that are not consistent with the long-term, goal-relevant 
(e.g., proper nutrition) rewards they generate. 
An important open question is whether this pattern of interregional neural activity is also involved 
in other decision domains, such as those involving intertemporal monetary tradeoffs. This question 
is important because comparing the mechanisms at work in different decision contexts is a critical 
step in identifying common mechanisms that facilitate self-control. Theoretically, these circuits 
should also influence the degree of discounting for delayed rewards in the case of ITC, as long as 
dlPFC modulation of vmPFC can lead to an increased (or decreased) weighting for delayed 
rewards. 
Here we address this open question by testing the following three hypotheses. First, we 
hypothesized that the same sub-regions of left dlPFC that are more active during self-control in 
dietary choice would also be more active in ITC when the subjects choose the larger-delayed 
payment over the money available today, after controlling for their value difference. Note that it is 
crucial to control for the value difference, because if the subjective value of the delayed reward is 
large enough, the decision to wait becomes trivial. Second, we hypothesized that effective 
connectivity from left dlPFC to vmPFC would be stronger during trials in which subjects choose 
larger-delayed rewards (again controlling for subjective value), which is consistent with the idea 
that dlPFC can modulate the value signals in vmPFC so that they place more weight on the value of 
delayed payouts. Third, we hypothesized that the levels of activation in dlPFC, as well as its 
effective connectivity to vmPFC, would help to explain differences in discount rates across subjects.  
These hypotheses are based not only on previous work in dietary choice, but also on findings from 
the previous literature on goal-directed choice. First, areas of vmPFC, and the ventral striatum 
(vStr), have consistently been shown to correlate with stimulus values at the time of choice across a 
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wide variety of decision contexts187-196, including decisions involving intertemporal 
tradeoffs74,76,88,89,197. Second, previous studies have associated responses in left dlPFC with choosing 
to wait for delayed monetary rewards using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and fMRI79,82. 
In particular, Figner et al. (2010) showed that temporarily reducing activity in left dlPFC using 
TMS results in subjects making more impatient choices, thus, establishing a causal role for this 
region in temporal discounting82. Third, recent studies have found that resting-state connectivity in 
networks including left dlPFC was correlated with discount rates198,199. 
Despite the attractiveness of the theory, and the body of consistent evidence, critical questions 
remain open. In particular, none of the previous studies have examined the effective connectivity 
between dlPFC and vmPFC during ITCs, nor can they establish that the dlPFC influences discount 
rates through a mechanism that involves the modulation of the stimulus values computed in 
vmPFC, or that the effective connectivity runs from dlPFC to vmPFC, and not the other way 
around. Here we are able to address these questions by estimating dynamic causal models200, and 
using their estimates to explain and predict differences in discount rates across individuals. 
Materials and methods 
Participants. Twenty-seven (18 males; age: mean = 24.1 years, range = 19-40) were included in the 
study. Two additional subjects were excluded because of excessive head motion during the 
scanning session (≥ 2 mm in translation or rotation). All participants had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, no history of neurological, psychiatric, or metabolic illness, and were not taking any 
medications that interfere with the BOLD signal at the time of scanning. The Institutional Review 
Board at California Institute of Technology approved the methods and procedures used in this 
study. 
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ITC task. On every trial, subjects chose between getting $25 at the end of the experiment, and 
getting an equal or larger amount at a later date. The later offers ranged from $25 to $54, with a 
delay from 7 to 200 days. Subjects made 216 decisions. The unique combinations of amount and 
delay used are shown in Table S3.1. All subjects saw the same set of options, although in different 
random orders. Each option was shown twice. Note that presenting all subjects with the same 
options was necessary to subsequently test how neural activity relates to discount rates. Although 
beneficial for the hypotheses tested in previous studies74,77,201, tailoring the choice sets around the 
indifference points of each subject would create a confound when examining how individual 
differences in neural activity relate to discount rates, since less patient subjects would be shown 
delayed rewards with higher monetary values. 
As described in Figure 3.1, each trial began with an offer presented onscreen. Participants were 
required to press within 3 s to indicate whether or not they accepted the delayed reward offered. 
Only the varying delayed option was presented onscreen. A button press response resulted in the 
termination of the offer screen, and the appearance of a feedback screen for 250 ms displaying 
‘Yes’, if the delayed offer was accepted, or ‘No’, if it was rejected. The phrase ‘No decision 
received’ was displayed if the subject failed to respond within 3 s (mean = 2% of trials, median = 
0%). Trials were separated by a fixation cross of random duration (uniform: 2-6 s). The assignment 
of left/right button presses to accept/reject responses was counterbalanced across subjects. At the 
end of the experiment a single trial was randomly chosen and implemented: subjects received the 
chosen option in addition to $50 (available immediately) for participating in the study.  
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Figure 3.1. Task design and behavioral data. A) Example display screens and timing parameters. 
B) Choice curve displaying the probability of choosing the larger, delayed reward. The y-axis 
shows the probability of selecting the future reward and the x-axis displays the stimulus value of 
the future reward. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. C) Bar graph showing the 
distribution of discounting parameters. 
All payments were made using prepaid debit cards given to the subjects at the end of the 
experiment. This allowed us to make the delayed payments available on the appropriate date, 
without requiring subjects to return to the lab.  
Behavioral data analysis. We estimated an individual discount factor (denoted by k) for each 
subject using maximum likelihood. In particular, we assumed that subjects assigned value to the 
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delayed options using a hyperbolic discounting function, in which the value of $A with a delay of D 
days is given by 
dSV = A/(1+kD), 
where dSV denotes the discounted stimulus value. We also assumed that the probability of 
accepting the delayed option is given by the soft-max function 
P(Yes) = (1+exp(b*(25 - dSV)))-1, 
where b is a non-negative parameter that modulates the slope of the psychometric choice function. 
Note that in this formula the value of the constant reference option is $25. 
Imaging data acquisition. fMRI data were collected in a Siemens (Erlangen, Germany) 3.0 Tesla 
Trio MRI scanner. Using an eight-channel, phased array head coil, we collected gradient echo, T2*-
weighted EPI images with BOLD contrast. In order to optimize BOLD sensitivity, we used a tilted 
acquisition in an orientation 30o oblique to the AC-PC line159. The imaging parameters were as 
follows: TR = 2500 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 80o; FOV = 192 mm; in-plane resolution = 3-mm 
x 3-mm; and 40 3-mm slices (0.3-mm gap) with ascending acquisition. While in the scanner, 
subjects completed two sessions of the ITC task (with 323 volumes acquired per session). They also 
completed an additional task involving the degustation of liquid rewards that is not relevant to this 
study (task order was counterbalanced across participants). High-resolution, whole-brain, T1- 
weighted structural images (TR = 1500 ms; TE = 3.05 ms; flip angle = 10o; voxel resolution = 1 
mm3; single-shot, ascending acquisition) were also collected for each participant. These images 
were coregistered with the their respective EPI images to assist with the anatomical localization of 
the functional activations. 
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fMRI data preprocessing. Imaging data were preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Data were corrected for motion with 
realignment to the mean image, spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute EPI 
template, resampled to 3 mm3 voxels, and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel (full-width-
at-half-maximum = 8 mm). Data were also temporally filtered using a filter width of 128 s. 
GLMs. We estimated two different mixed effect models of the BOLD responses, with AR(1). The 
models were designed to localize in our sample the areas of vmPFC and vStr that, as discussed in 
the introduction, have been repeatedly shown to correlate with stimulus values at the time of choice. 
The models are identical except for the specification of the value modulators. 
The first model, GLM-1, had the following regressors of interest: 1) an indicator function beginning 
at the onset of each decision screen with duration equal to the reaction time for that trial, 2) the 
indicator function modulated by the subject specific value of each delayed offer (dSV), and 3) the 
indicator function modulated by the variable Accept (which equals 1 if the subject chooses the 
delayed outcome, and zero otherwise). The third regressor was orthogonalized with respect to the 
second one in order to assign any shared variance between them to the dSV regressor. The model 
also included session dummies, linear time trends, and head movements as regressors of no interest. 
The second model, GLM-2, was identical except for the specification of the parametric regressor. In 
particular, for the reasons described in the results section, we defined a relative discounted 
subjective value (rdSV) variable, which is equal to dSV (and equivalent to dSV-25) for subjects that 
choose the delayed variable more than 50% of the time (15 subjects), and is equal to –dSV 
(equivalent to 25-dSV) for those that choose the immediate option more frequently (12 subjects). 
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Both GLMs were estimated in three steps. First we estimated the model at the individual level. 
Second, we calculated the following first-level single-subject contrasts: regressor 2 vs. baseline, and 
regressor 3 vs. baseline. Third, we calculated second-level group contrasts using one-sample t-tests 
on the single-subject contrasts.  
We controlled for multiple comparisons at the cluster level using an individual voxel threshold of p 
< 0.005 to achieve a whole brain corrected (WBC) p-values less than 0.05 (cluster sizes are listed in 
each supplemental table). We also used small volume corrections (SVCs) in areas of a priori 
interest to the study of the self-control mechanisms that are at the core of the hypotheses tested here. 
We carried out an SVC in the vmPFC using an anatomical mask based on the AAL atlas202 that 
included the rectal gyrus, medial orbitofrontal, and anterior cingulate cortex below z = 5 (1619 3-
mm3 voxels). A region in left dorsolateral PFC, in BA 46, has been shown to play a role in various 
types of self-control tasks82,88,89. Because anatomical masks of dlPFC lacked the required specificity 
to isolate this region, we carried out SVC using a mask composed of a 10-mm radius sphere 
centered around the target coordinates (xyz = [-36 30 27]) used by Figner and others (2010) to 
demonstrate a causal role of dlPFC on discounting behavior82. Finally, previous studies of dietary 
self-control have also implicated a different region of left dlPFC, in BA 9, and so we carried out 
SVC for activations in this area using a similar masking procedure (10 mm radius sphere centered 
on peak coordinate: xyz = [-48 15 24]; taken from Hare et al.88). 
Dynamic causal modeling. We tested the hypothesis that the effective connectivity from left 
dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC plays a critical role in self-control using dynamic causal modeling 
(DCM)200. The analysis proceeded in several steps. 
First, for each subject we extracted average activation time courses from vmPFC and left dlPFC-
BA46. In particular, for every subject we defined an ROI with a 5-mm radius, and a center given by 
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each subject’s most significant voxel within the group ROIs. The group ROI in vmPFC was defined 
based on the conjunction between voxels showing an effect for the rdSV and Accept regressors from 
GLM-2 at an uncorrected threshold of p < 0.005. The group ROI in dlPFC-BA 46 was defined as all 
voxels showing an effect for the Accept regressor from GLM-2 at an uncorrected threshold of p < 
0.005.  
Second, we optimized the basic architecture of the DCM, in terms of where experimental inputs 
entered. To do so, we estimated 64 different DCMs that could be organized into four different 
families (Figure 3.5A), based on how the variables rdSV and Accept affect activity in dlPFC and 
vmPFC. Each family contained 16 models that varied in terms of the combinations of connectivity 
between vmPFC and dlPFC-BA46 as a function of three events: fixation, all choice periods, and 
choice periods in which the delayed option is selected.  
Third, we compared each model family using Bayesian model selection203 to determine the most 
likely pattern of task related inputs into dlPFC and vmPFC.  
Fourth, having optimized the model inputs, we calculated the parameter estimates and posterior 
probabilities of the full model (i.e., the one containing coupling parameters from dlPFC-BA46 to 
vmPFC and vice versa for all choice types and inter-trial fixation, as shown in Figure 3.5). 
Parameter estimates were computed using Bayesian parameter averaging over subjects204. For 
completeness, we also tested the effective connectivity parameters from dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC 
using two-tailed, one-sample t-tests against zero across individuals. 
Prediction exercise. We tested the hypothesis that the effective connectivity from left dlPFC-BA46 
to vmPFC predicts between-subjects differences in the discount rate using the following out-of-
sample prediction exercise. For every subject, we estimated an elastic net regression (alpha 
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parameter = 0.3) on the other N-1 subjects with the log of the individual discount rates (k) as the 
dependent variable, and the complete set of estimated DCM parameters (exclusive of the 
hemodynamic parameters) as the independent variables. We then used the fitted coefficients from 
the elastic net model to predict if the discount parameter for the excluded individual was above or 
below the mean value for the N-1 subjects. The procedure was repeated for every subject. Finally, 
we computed the balanced accuracy of the prediction using the confusion matrix, in which the rows 
represent the true labels and the columns represent the predicted labels, generated by our 
classification results205. Briefly, this method controls for any imbalance in the data classes that may 
bias the classifier accuracy. The balanced accuracy is computed as  
12 TPTP + FN +    TNTN + FP , 
where TP, FN, TN, and FP represent the number of true positives, false negatives, true negatives, 
and false positives respectively. 
In order to further test the specificity of our findings, we carried out different versions of this 
prediction exercise, in which subsets of the DCM parameters were excluded (see the Results section 
for details), or other candidate regions replaced dlPFC-BA46 or vmPFC in the DCM. In all cases, 
we used the same fully connected DCM model with a fixed input to dlPFC-BA46 (or its 
replacement, when appropriate) on accepted trials and an input parametrically varying with the 
subjective value of the delayed reward to vmPFC (or its replacement). 
Specificity test: dlPFC-BA9 to vmPFC. This test was designed to test the specificity of BA46 on 
the results. To do this, we repeated the DCM and prediction exercises described above using the left 
dlPFC-BA9 shown in Figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2. Increased activity in left dlPFC when choosing to accept larger, delayed rewards after 
controlling for subjective value (p < 0.05, SVC). The region of BA 46 shown here lies directly 
beneath the TMS stimulation site from Figner et al. (2010) that showed causal effects on temporal 
discounting behavior82. 
Specificity test: dlPFC-BA46 to vStr. Activity in vStr has often been shown to correlate with 
stimulus values at the time of choice, and in fact was significantly correlated with dSV in GLM-1. 
Therefore, we repeated the DCM and prediction exercise described above using the vStr ROI shown 
in Figure 3.3, instead of the vmPFC. The details of the analysis are identical to those described 
above, except that the experimental input variable dSV was used instead of rdSV. This change was 
based on the fact that, as described below, vStr responses at the time of choice reflected dSV, but 
not rdSV at the group level. 
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Figure 3.3. Ventral striatum region positively correlated with dSV in GLM-1 (p< 0.05, WBC). 
Results 
Choice behavior. We began the analysis by estimating individual discount rates (denoted by k) 
using maximum likelihood, and under the well-validated assumption that subjects exhibit 
hyperbolic discounting58,90,206. These estimates also allowed us to compute the discounted stimulus 
value (dSV) that each subject assigned to each option. As shown in Figure 3.1B, which depicts the 
group’s psychometric choice curve, the estimated values provided a good description of the choice 
data. Figure 3.1C provides an ordered histogram of the estimated discount parameters (with larger 
values denoting more frequent choices for immediate reward), and shows that there were sizable 
differences across individuals in the estimated discount parameters. This is important because one 
of the goals of the study is to relate individual differences in brain activity to differences in 
discounting behavior. 
Reaction times. Subjects responded well under the time limit of 3 seconds for both immediate 
(mean = 1.22 s, SD = 0.24 s, t26 = -39.2, p < 0.001) and delayed choices (mean = 1.20 s, SD = 0.25 
s, t26 = -37.2, p < 0.001). An ANOVA on reaction times as a function of choice (accept delayed 
offer vs. take money now) and group (those who chose to wait for delayed rewards on the majority 
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of trials – wait group, WG – versus those who most often took the money available today – now 
group, NG) showed no main effects of choice or group (p=0.76 and p=0.49, respectively). 
However, there was an interaction between the tendency to wait and choice (F(1,48) = 4.79, p < 0.05). 
This interaction was driven by the fact that WG subjects showed faster reaction times when 
choosing the delayed reward (mean = 1133 ± 70 ms) than when choosing the immediate reward 
(mean = 1277 ± 63 ms; t14 = -3.99, p < 0.001), whereas NG subjects had slower reaction times when 
choosing the delayed reward (mean = 1278 ± 62 ms) compared to immediate rewards (mean = 1143 
± 60 ms; t11 = 2.58, p < 0.05). 
GLM analyses localizing the dlPFC and vmPFC ROIs. A central goal of this study was to 
investigate the role of effective connectivity between the area of vmPFC that has been widely 
associated with the computation of stimulus values at the time of choice, and an area of left dlPFC, 
in BA 46, that has been shown to exert a causal influence on discounting behavior in monetary ITCs 
and implicated in self-control processes in various domains. See the introduction and discussion for 
references. In order to carry out the connectivity analyses, we first needed to localize these two 
brain regions in our sample.  
To do this, we first estimated a GLM of the BOLD responses that contained dSV and Accept 
(defined as 1 if the subject chose to accept the delayed option, and 0 otherwise) as parametric 
modulators at the time of decision (GLM-1). Based on previous studies, we expected that activity in 
vmPFC and vStr would correlate with the dSV regressor, as these areas have been shown to encode 
subjective values at the time of choice207,208. Note that in our task, the immediate option was 
invariant ($25), whereas the delayed option changed every trial. Therefore, all trial-wise variation 
affected by the value of the delayed option is driven by dSV, even if the brain computes relative 
value signals (e.g., dSV-25 or 25-dSV).  
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The contrast for the Accept regressor showed that, after controlling for dSV, regions of left dlPFC in 
BA 46 and BA 9 were more active when subjects chose the larger, delayed option (p < 0.05, SVC; 
Figure 3.2; Table S3.2). No regions were more active when declining the larger delayed reward in 
favor of the $25 today. Note that this increased activity when accepting delayed options is present 
after controlling for dSV, indicating that it does not reflect a mere tendency of the subjects to choose 
larger rewards more frequently (indeed 12 out of 27 subjects in our sample choose the objectively 
smaller reward today most often). 
To our surprise, the contrast for dSV showed that voxels in a large cluster including vStr, but not in 
vmPFC, were positively correlated with dSV (p < 0.05, WBC; Figure 3.3; see Table S3.3 for a full 
list of activations). No regions showed negative correlations with dSV at whole brain or small 
volume corrected thresholds.  
Given that previous studies have found evidence consistent with the encoding of relative value 
signals in vmPFC at the time of choice188,209,210, we carried out an additional, post-hoc model 
(GLM-2). We hypothesized that there might be individual differences in the computation of the 
relative subjective value. In fact, a class of popular models in behavioral economics predicts that 
subjects will use as their reference item (i.e., the one that is subtracted when computing relative 
value) the option that they choose most frequently211. Based on this, we defined a relative 
discounted subjective value regressor (rdSV) that is given by dSV (equivalent to dSV-25) for those 
that chose the delayed option more than 50% of the time, and by -dSV (equivalent to 25-dSV) for 
those that selected the immediate option most frequently. 
We estimated a new GLM (GLM-2) with rdSV and Accept as parametric modulators at the time of 
decision. Consistent with the post-hoc hypothesis that value computations were made relative to the 
most frequent choice, we found that BOLD responses in vmPFC (p < 0.05, SVC; Figure 3.4; Table 
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S3.4) and the anterior superior temporal gyri (p < 0.05, WBC) were positively correlated with the 
modified value regressor. In addition, several regions including the anterior insula (AI), 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), inferior parietal cortex, middle frontal gyri, and posterior 
cingulate showed negative correlations with rdSV (p < 0.05, WBC; Figure 3.4B; Table S3.5). Both 
the vmPFC region that positively correlated with rdSV and the portions of the AI and dmPFC that 
negatively correlated with rdSV show considerable overlap with results from recent meta-
analyses207,208 on the encoding of subjective value (Figure 3.4C and Figure 3.4D).  
 
Figure 3.4. Areas correlated with the rdSV regressor from GLM-2. A) A region of vmPFC 
showing increased activity as a function of rdSV (p < 0.05, SVC). B) Regions of the dmPFC and 
AI where activity decreased as a function of rdSV (p < 0.05, WBC). C) Voxels in vmPFC where 
the activation for rdSV in the current study overlaps with significant voxels in meta-analyses of 
positive correlations with subjective value by Bartra et al.207 and Clithero and Rangel208. All 
voxels shown in violet are significant in all three studies. D) Voxels in dmPFC and AI where 
responses to rdSV overlap with the results of meta-analyses for regions that negatively correlated 
33 with subjective value at the time of choice in Bartra et al.207 All voxels shown in violet are 
significant in both studies. 
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This overlap with previous results for both positive and negative correlations with subjective value 
suggests that there is significant variation between subjects in how discounted subjective values are 
computed, and that this computation may be related to choice frequencies (e.g., most often wait or 
rarely wait) consistent with our post-hoc hypothesis. Naturally, we cannot infer any causal 
relationships between choice frequency, and the directionality of relative discounted subjective 
value computations from these results; it may be that a third as yet unknown variable drives choice 
preference, value computation, or both. However, this analysis provides us with a sample-specific 
ROI of vmPFC in which to test our main hypothesis about dlPFC modulation and the prediction of 
individual differences. 
Consistent with GLM-1, GLM-2 showed that regions of left dlPFC in BA 46 and 9 were more 
active when subjects chose the larger, delayed option (p < 0.05, SVC; Table S3.6). Just as in GLM-
1, no regions were more active when declining the larger delayed reward in favor of the $25 today. 
Note that both GLM-1 and GLM-2 control for the value of delayed rewards in a similar manner. 
Since in the individual subject GLMs only the sign of dSV changes, the variance explained is the 
same in both models, and only the sign on the regression coefficients changes. 
Tests of effective connectivity. Next, we used the ROIs in dlPFC-BA46 and vmPFC to test our first 
hypothesis; namely, that effective connectivity from left dlPFC-BA4 to vmPFC plays a critical role 
in delaying gratification. This test was carried out on time courses extracted from the vmPFC and 
dlPFC-BA46 ROIs identified in GLM-2. We focused on the ROI in BA 46, instead of the one in 
BA 9, because a previous TMS study found a causal role for this region in choosing to wait for 
larger delayed rewards in monetary ITCs82. Furthermore, our previous effective connectivity 
analyses of dietary self-control choices suggested that BA 9 might modulate vmPFC via 
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intermediate effects on BA 4688. As explained in the Methods section, the test was performed in 
several steps. 
First, we estimated four different DCM families that were grouped based on how the experimental 
variables rdSV and Accept entered into the model as driving inputs (Figure 3.5A). Each family 
contained 16 models that varied on how the vmPFC and dlPFC-BA46 affect each other as a 
function of three task events: fixation, choice periods, and choice periods when the delayed option 
is selected. 
Second, we used Bayesian model selection to identify the most likely family of models. The most 
likely model family (exceedance probability = 0.87), shown in Figure 3.5A, had two driving inputs: 
an input to vmPFC given by the rdSV of the delayed option on every trial, and an input to dlPFC-
BA46 given by Accept.  
Third, we examined the effective connectivity parameters between dlPFC-BA46 and vmPFC using 
Bayesian parameter averaging on the fully connected model (Figure 3.5B) with the most likely 
experimental inputs across subjects. We found increased signaling from dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC at 
the time of choice, and further increases when subjects selected the later option (posterior 
probability > 0.90 and 0.95, respectively; Figure 3.5C). In contrast, the signaling in the other 
direction was not significantly different from zero. For completeness, we also compared the 
estimated DCM coefficients using one-sample t-tests, which lead to the same conclusion: effective 
connectivity parameters from dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC increased during all choices and further 
increased when subjects selected the later option (t26 = 2.65 and t26 = 3.80 respectively; p < 0.01), 
but signaling in the opposite direction did not increase significantly during any task events, 
suggesting that there is increased connectivity from dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC during decisions to 
wait for larger delayed rewards, but not in the other direction. 
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Figure 3.5. Dynamic causal modeling results. A) Schematic representations of the four DCM 
families compared in order to optimize the task related driving input to dlPFC-BA46 and vmPFC. 
Bayesian Model comparison showed that Family 1, outlined in black, was the most likely 
description of the data generating process. B) Diagram of the fully connected model from the 
most likely family showing the posterior probabilities of coupling or coupling modulation greater 
than zero between vmPFC to dlPFC-BA46. ‘Fixed’ refers to the baseline coupling during all time 
points. ‘All Choices’ refers to coupling modulation at the time of decision for all choices 
regardless of whether the immediate or delayed option was selected. ‘Later Choices’ refers to 
coupling modulation during only those decisions when the larger, delayed option was chosen. C) 
Bar chart showing the effective connectivity (EC) strengths in Hertz (Hz) between dlPFC-BA46 
and vmPFC at different task periods. The colors and labels correspond to the diagram in panel B. 
Asterisks indicate DCM parameters that are significantly different from zero when tested using 
both Bayesian parameter averaging (posterior probability > 0.90) and one sample t-tests (p < 
0.01). 
Between-subjects prediction. Next, we used the results of the DCM to test our second hypothesis, 
namely, that it is possible to use inter-individual differences in the strength of effective connectivity 
between dlPFC-BA46 and vmPFC, as well as differences in local responses in those regions, to 
predict differences in discount rates. 
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For each subject we estimated an elastic net regression model using only the data from the N-1 
other subjects, with discount rates as the dependent variable, and the estimated DCM parameters as 
the predictors. The estimated parameters of the model were then used to predict whether the 
discount rate of the excluded subject was above or below the mean of the group. The procedure was 
repeated to obtain a prediction for each subject. We found that the mean balanced accuracy (MBA) 
across all subjects was 71% correct (95% posterior probability interval = 54-85%). In addition, 
there was a significant correlation between discount rates predicted by the model and the discount 
rates estimated from the behavioral choices (Spearman’s rho = 0.42, p < 0.02). 
Next, we compared the accuracy of several versions of this prediction exercise, to test the specific 
role of the various components of the DCM in predicting the individual discount rates. Note that all 
parameters were estimated in the fully connected version of the model (shown in Figure 3.5) and 
were simply omitted from the elastic net regressions during these tests. The first test excluded the 
local driving input response parameters in vmPFC (Spearman’s rho = 0.14, p = 0.48; MBA = 65%; 
95% post. prob. int. = 47-80%). The second test excluded the local driving input response 
parameters for dlPFC-BA46 (Spearman’s rho = -0.03, p = 0.90; MBA = 60%; 95% post. prob. int.= 
44-76%). The third test excluded the effective connectivity parameters from dlPFC-BA46 to 
vmPFC (Spearman’s rho = -0.12, p=0.54; MBA = 58%; 95% post. prob. int. = 41-74%). The fourth 
test excluded the effective connectivity parameters in the other direction (Spearman’s rho = 0.02, p 
= 0.91; MBA = 54%; 95% post. prob. int. = 37-70%). 
The logic of these tests is as follows: the prediction accuracy of a regression model that excludes a 
key parameter should drop. In contrast, excluding a parameter that does not play a role in ITC 
should not affect the model’s ability to predict the discount rates. We found that omitting effective 
connectivity parameters between dlPFC-BA46 and vmPFC in either direction, or parameters 
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measuring local task induced responses within dlPFC-BA46 or vmPFC, reduced the accuracy to 
chance levels. Together, these findings show that the local responses in both areas, as well as both 
directions of effective connectivity between dlPFC and vmPFC, are critical for explaining the 
individual differences in discounting. Table S3.7 lists the relative size and direction of the effects of 
each DCM parameter on discount rates. 
The vStr has also been repeatedly implicated in value-based choice and learning, and we found that 
this area correlated with dSV in GLM-1. Therefore, we repeated the prediction exercise to 
investigate the role of effective connectivity between left dlPFC-BA46 and vStr. The procedures 
and results paralleled those for vmPFC. First, we estimated a DCM paralleling that shown in Fig. 5, 
except that we replaced vmPFC with the vStr and used dSV rather than rdSV as a driving input, 
because that is the variable reflected by vStr (Table S3.8). The group ROI in vStr was defined by all 
voxels showing a significant effect for dSV in GLM-1 at p < 0.001 uncorrected. Second, we found 
that the elastic net model significantly predicted individual differences in discount rates (MBA = 
75%; 95% post. prob. int. = 60-88%). Third, the discount rates predicted by the model were 
significantly correlated with those estimated from the behavior (Spearman’s rho = 0.48, p < 0.02). 
Fourth, removing DCM parameters from the elastic net regressions also showed that both local 
(MBA without = 64%; 95% post. prob. int. = 47%-80%) and effective connectivity (MBA without 
= 48%; 95% post. prob. int. = 31%-65%) parameters were required for significant predictions. 
Together, these findings show that the local responses in vStr, as well as the connectivity between 
dlPFC and vStr, can also explain a significant portion of the variability in individual discounting 
rates.  
Finally, we tested the specificity of these results with regard to the left dlPFC-BA46 region. We 
replaced left dlPFC-BA46 in DCMs using both the vmPFC and vStr with either the more posterior 
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left dlPFC-BA9 ROI that was also found to increase its activity when subjects chose the delayed 
rewards, or an ROI created by mirroring the 10-mm sphere centered on the estimated coordinates 
from Figner and colleagues82 on the right hemisphere. This resulted in a total of four new DCMs 
and elastic net regression models. None of these combinations yielded significantly better than 
chance predictions (best MBA = 55%) or significant correlations with the true discount rates. The 
results replacing left dlPFC-BA 46 with the analogous region in the right hemisphere are consistent 
with previous TMS results showing that only stimulation of the left hemisphere impacted choices 
for the delayed monetary rewards82. 
Discussion 
The results in this paper suggest that a similar set of computational and neurobiological mechanisms 
are at work in tasks involving dietary self-control and in monetary ITC. In particular, we found that 
two distinct areas of left dlPFC, in BA 9 and 46, became more active in trials in which subjects 
choose the delayed option, which on average requires more self-control. We also found that the 
connectivity from left dlPFC-BA46 to a region of vmPFC widely associated with the computational 
of stimulus values207,208 increased at the time of choice, and especially during trials in which 
subjects chose to wait for the delayed reward. In addition, we were able to explain between-subject 
differences in discount rates using the estimated parameters from a DCM including the activity 
within dlPFC-BA46 and vmPFC or vStr, and the coupling between them, but only if the effective 
connectivity parameters between the two areas were included. 
These results parallel previous findings in the domain of dietary choice, in which individuals chose 
among foods that differed in their tastiness and healthiness88,89, although an explicit between-subject 
prediction exercise was not performed in those previous studies. This suggests that the mechanisms 
mediating self-control described in the introduction are at work in both tasks, and thus helps to 
advance our understanding of common computational and neurobiological components of various 
  
81 
forms of self-control. In this model, vmPFC computes the value of options by identifying its various 
attributes, assigning value to them, and then integrating them into a net value for the option. A 
critical component of the model is that basic attributes (like immediate monetary payoffs, or the 
tastiness of foods) are preferentially incorporated into the values computed in vmPFC, but that more 
abstract attributes (like delayed monetary payoffs, or the healthiness of foods) are generally given 
less weight unless left dlPFC comes online and modulates activity in vmPFC, so that it weights all 
attributes according to the current goals (e.g., eat healthy or maximize monetary payoff). Note that 
the types of attributes that need to be represented and evaluated in both types of tasks are different, 
but that poor self-control could be attributed to the same source in both cases: reduced weighting of 
abstract attributes in vmPFC in the absence of dlPFC modulation. 
One limitation of the study must be emphasized. Our experiment is not able to differentiate between 
heterogeneity in the discount rates attributable to patience or self-control abilities (potentially 
mediated by differences in dlPFC functioning or connectivity), and heterogeneity due to differences 
in individual circumstances (e.g., immediate budgetary constraints) that are not directly associated 
with patience or self-control. Differences in individual circumstances, therefore, do not enter our 
prediction model and may be one reason why the model is less than perfectly accurate. In other 
words, our analysis cannot indicate if less patient subjects failed to wait for delayed rewards 
because they are unable to do so, or because their best option was to take the immediate monetary 
payout.  
These results provide novel interpretations of results in the sizable literature on ITC paradigms. 
Consider three important examples. First, there is an on-going debate on whether or not there are 
multiple and competing value signals at work in self-control. In particular, previous findings79,80 
have been interpreted as suggesting that vmPFC-vStr and dlPFC compute parallel but distinct value 
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signals, with a vmPFC-vStr valuation system placing more value on immediate, concrete outcomes, 
and areas such as dlPFC computing the value of long-term, abstract goals. In this view, the quality 
of decisions depends on competition between the two valuation systems. In contrast, others have 
proposed that one value system integrates information about all stimulus attributes, both immediate 
and long-term, to form an overall value for the stimulus74,212. In this view, the quality of decision-
making depends solely on the weighting of different stimulus attributes in value computation. The 
results here, and in previous work88,89, suggest an obvious way of reconciling both views. In this 
class of tasks, choices seem to be driven by the stimulus value signals encoded in a vmPFC-based 
valuation system, but the activation of dlPFC is critical for the deployment of self-control because it 
appears to promote increased weighting of foresighted stimulus attributes in the vmPFC value 
signals, as evidenced by increased effective connectivity to vmPFC during larger delayed choices.  
Second, our results provide a mechanistic explanation of the influential study of Figner and 
colleagues (2010), which found that applying inhibitory TMS over left – but not right – dlPFC-
BA46 resulted in a decrease in subjects’ willingness to wait for delayed rewards82. Consistent with 
the implication of a causal role for left dlPFC in self-control from these previous results, we find 
that this region is more active when subjects chose larger future rewards over payments on the same 
day, after controlling for the subjective value of the future payments. Furthermore, our data and 
analyses indicate that the left BA 46 region of dlPFC contributes to delaying gratification by 
influencing the valuation process in vmPFC at the time of choice, rather than intervening after 
valuation has occurred, as was suggested by Figner et al. (2010). This suggestion by Figner and 
colleagues was based on their finding that choices over delayed options, but not the attractiveness 
ratings of those delayed rewards were affected by TMS to left dlPFC82. However, our data on 
effective connectivity from dlPFC to vmPFC at the time of choice are more consistent with a 
mechanism in which dlPFC activity directly impacts valuation processes at the time of choice. We 
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note, however, that these results are not contrary to Figner and colleagues’ assertion that the role of 
dlPFC is specific to decisions as opposed to outcome free ratings. 
Third, recent EEG and fMRI studies have found that individual measurements of activity and 
connectivity within networks, including of left dlPFC taken at rest, exhibited a sizable correlation 
with discount rates taken in separate behavioral tasks198,199. Similarly, a study of alcoholics found 
that responses in left dlPFC also correlated individual discount rates213. Our results provide a novel 
mechanistic explanation for these findings. Furthermore, our prediction exercises show that 
measures of effective connectivity between dlPFC and vmPFC are a critical aspect of being able to 
predict individual discount rates. 
We investigated the specificity of the dlPFC-vmPFC interactions in self-control by repeating a 
similar exercise replacing vmPFC with vStr or left dlPFC-BA46 with left dlPFC-BA9 or right 
dlPFC-BA46.  The specificity test using left dlPFC-BA9 was motivated by the fact that this area 
was more active when subjects delayed gratification (in this task, as well as in the dietary choice 
experiments). However, it did not result in significant correlations with or above average 
predictions of between-subject discount rates. This is consistent with our previous findings in 
dietary self-control where dlPFC-BA9 did not directly interact with vmPFC, but rather affected a 
more anterior region in BA 46, near the region we find in the current monetary ITC task. 
The test between dlPFC-BA46 and vStr was motivated by the fact that vStr is also an area of great 
interest in the field because it has been shown to be correlated with the subjective values, including 
those of delayed options, in this and many other studies207,214. In particular, the vStr is a logical 
target of modulation given its well known role in both reward anticipation and outcome 
evaluation215-217, effort motivation218, and successful emotional regulation219. In this case, we found 
that the pattern of results was very similar to the one for the dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC results. There 
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are two natural interpretations of this finding. One is that both vmPFC and vStr are computing value 
signals that are modulated by left dlPFC. Another interpretation is that the modulation of vStr 
changes motivation, anticipation, or salience signals processed in vStr rather than value 
computations. Unfortunately, these two hypotheses cannot be tested against one another in the 
present dataset. However, previous work showing that stimulus values are more likely to be 
reflected in vmPFC than in vStr provides some evidence in favor of the second interpretation75,220. 
The ITC task utilized here, as well as the dietary choice task that we have used in our previous 
related work88, examines the deployment of self-control in the context of goal-directed choice. 
Other types of self-regulation might be better characterized by competition between habitual and 
goal-directed systems221-223, or by the type of response inhibition associated with action control in 
paradigms such as the go/no-go, Flanker, or Stroop tasks224,225. Future work should systematically 
investigate the commonalities and differences between these various sources of self-regulation. 
Another avenue for further investigation is our finding that subjects appear to compute the 
discounted subjective value of delayed rewards relative to their most common choice, perhaps 
viewing this as a default. While not true in every case, the majority of subjects who most often 
chose the immediate reward appeared to positively encode a relative value signal in vmPFC equal 
to the difference between the immediate reward and the larger delayed reward (i.e., $25 - dSV). 
They also showed negative correlations with this relative value signal in a network of regions that 
includes dmPFC, AI, and parietal regions consistently shown to negatively correlate with SV207. 
This network has been implicated in computations related to conflict, error processing, decision 
difficulty, and evidence accumulation226-231. On the other hand, subjects who most often waited for 
the delayed reward frequently encoded the opposite relative value signal of dSV - $25 in both sets of 
regions. This suggests that it is important to control for reference point variation across subjects 
when examining the neural correlates of subjective values at the group level. 
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While our findings may at first seem contradictory to previous reports where all subjects showed 
positive correlations with a value signal proportional to later reward - immediate reward, this can 
potentially be explained by important methodological differences. Many previous studies of ITC 
have customized the offer sets for each participant to maintain an acceptance rate close to 50% for 
all subjects74,77,201,212. In contrast, we purposefully utilized the same offer set for all subjects to 
examine individual differences in neural responses. By keeping the response rate near 50% for all 
subjects, these previous studies may have also generated a more homogeneous encoding of relative 
value in their participants, thus avoiding the heterogeneity present in our dataset. These previous 
datasets also highlight that, with regard to relative value computations, our findings are likely driven 
by choice or action probabilities rather than as a function of discount rates or self-control ability; 
this is because these previous datasets show that when subjects with high discount rates are 
presented with choices around their indifference points, they also have positive correlations with 
delayed reward values in vmPFC. Such changes in the directionality of relative value computations 
as a function of choice or action probability represent an important target for future research. 
In summary, our data provide evidence that the dlPFC supports the delay of gratification by 
modulating activity in a vmPFC region that reflects the stimulus value of available rewards. Our 
between-subjects prediction results indicate that both local activity levels and connection strengths 
between these brain regions mediate delay of gratification tendencies in this task. These findings 
also suggest that examining effective connectivity parameters in pathological populations with self-
control deficits may provide useful insights into the biological basis of their dysfunction.
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Table S3.1. Amounts by delay. 
Delay  Amount 
7 25 26 28 30 32 35 
10 25 26 27 29 30 32 
12 25 26 28 31 33 35 
14 25 26 28 32 35 39 
21 26 27 29 30 32 38 
25 27 29 31 33 35 46 
28 26 28 32 35 39 46 
30 26 27 29 30 32 38 
40 27 33 35 40 47 54 
45 26 29 31 35 40 46 
50 27 30 35 40 46 54 
60 29 33 35 40 47 54 
90 26 30 33 40 46 54 
95 31 33 35 40 47 54 
100 26 31 38 39 46 54 
150 31 33 35 40 47 54 
180 27 31 35 39 46 54 
200 26 28 35 39 47 54 
       
 
Delays are listed in days and amounts are shown in USD. 
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Table S3.2. Regions more active when accepting delayed rewards controlling for discounted 
stimulus value in GLM-1. 
Region BA Side Cluster Size x y z Z 
score Cerebellum  R 74 27 -39 -24 4.56 
Occipital cortex 30/18 L 1166 -9 -66 12 4.23* 
Inferior frontal/precentral gyrus 9 L 109 -51 3 24 4.17 
–Small volume corrected peak   23 -48 6 24 3.97 s3 
Precentral/inferior frontal gyrus 6/9 R 118 36 -18 36 4.01 
Precuneus 7 R 23 24 -60 36 3.92 
Anterior cingulate/orbitofrontal 
Cortex 
32/24/10 L 82 -6 30 0 3.85 
–Small volume corrected size/peak   62 -3 30 0 3.59 s1 
Caudate/putamen  L 80 -21 24 0 3.85 
Thalamus  R 39 6 -6 3 3.61 
Cerebellum  L 38 -54 -54 -30 3.56 
Occipital cortex 18 R 86 21 -87 12 3.54 
Middle/inferior frontal gyrus 46 L 38 -30 33 15 3.42 
–Small volume corrected peak   15 -33 33 18 3.12 s2 
Thalamus  R 61 21 -27 0 3.38 
Middle frontal gyrus 6 R 55 30 6 54 3.36 
Cerebellum  L 91 -36 -57 -27 3.36 
Superior frontal gyrus 6 R 33 0 -9 72 3.28 
Precentral gyrus 6 L 80 -30 -12 60 3.15 
Occipital cortex 19 R 61 36 -78 -12 3.11 
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L 23 -9 -6 54 3.08 
Superior parietal cortex/precuneus 7 L 79 -18 -75 60 3.08 
Middle frontal gyrus 10/9 R 26 36 48 30 3.03 
Middle temporal gyrus 37 R 29 48 -51 0 3.02 
Superior frontal gyrus 6 L 22 -24 6 75 2.98 
        
 
Height threshold t = 2.78 (p < 0.005) and extent of at least 20 voxels for table inclusion 
Gray highlighting and * signify that the activation survives whole brain correction (p < 0.05) for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level. 
s1 signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within an anatomical mask of 
vmPFC. 
s2 signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within a 10 mm sphere centered 
on the estimated MNI coordinates from Figner et al. (2010; xyz = [-36 30 27]). 
s3 signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within a 10 mm sphere centered 
on the MNI coordinates from Hare et al. (2009; xyz = [-48 15 24]). 
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Table S3.3. Regions reflecting discounted stimulus value at the time of choice in GLM-1. 
Region BA Side Cluster Size x y z Z score 
Middle frontal gyrus 6 L 1277 -21 9 60 4.56* 
   Middle/inferior frontal gyrus 46 L  -36 36 15 4.06 
   Ventral striatum  L  -15 6 -3 3.55 
Parietal lobe white matter  R 247 30 -33 27 4.18* 
   Caudate  R  24 -18 24 3.97 
Inferior temporal lobe 19/37 L 61 -48 -57 -6 3.58 
   Occipital cortex 19 L  -48 -63 -12 3.47 
Ventral striatum  R 151 9 6 -3 3.26 
   Thalamus  L  -3 -18 12 3.21 
   Thalamus  L  -12 -6 9 3.1 
Middle frontal gyrus 10/46 R 34 42 45 21 3.13 
        
 
Height threshold t = 2.78 (p < 0.005) and extent of at least 20 voxels for table inclusion. 
Gray highlighting and * signify that the activation survives whole brain correction (p < 0.05) for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level. 
Labels in bold text are for the peak voxel within each cluster. Labels in plain text identify local 
maxima more than 8 mm apart in different anatomical regions of larger clusters. 
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Table S3.4. Regions positively correlated with relative discounted stimulus value at the time 
of choice in GLM-2. 
Region BA Side 
Cluster 
Size x y z Z score 
Superior temporal gyrus 21/22 R 944 66 -6 -3 4.11* 
Cingulate gyrus 24 R 152 3 -12 42 4.01 
Superior temporal gyrus 21 L 641 -39 -9 -9 3.88* 
Anterior cingulate/orbitofrontal cortex 32/24/10 L 118 -9 30 -6 3.73 
–Small volume corrected size/peak   81 -9 30 -6 3.73 s1 
Cingulate gyrus 24/31 L 165 -12 48 21 3.7 
Precuneus 3/5 R 96 18 -42 45 3.5 
Precuneus/cingulate gyrus 5/7 L 40 -9 -42 51 3.36 
Middle temporal gyrus 39 L 32 -51 -72 21 3.08 
        
 
Height threshold t = 2.78 (p < 0.005) and extent of at least 20 voxels for table inclusion. 
Gray highlighting and * signify that the activation survives whole brain correction (p < 0.05) for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level. 
s1 Signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within an anatomical mask of 
vmPFC. 
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Table  3.5. Regions negatively correlated with relative discounted stimulus value at the time 
of choice in GLM-2. 
Region BA Side Size x y z Z score 
Inferior parietal lobe 40 R 624 42 -57 54 4.96* 
Anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus 13/45 R 153 36 30 3 4.85* 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex/SMA 6/32 L 425 -6 21 48 4.84* 
   Superior frontal/anterior cingulate gyrus  R  12 27 39 4.84 
   Supplementary motor area (SMA)  R  6 18 45 4.84 
Anterior insula 13 L 105 -33 21 -3 4.61* 
Inferior frontal gyrus 45/47 L  -33 21 12 4.61 
Middle frontal gyrus 9 L 188 -39 12 39 4.55* 
   Middle frontal gyrus  L  -45 21 12 4.55 
   Middle frontal gyrus  L  -51 33 36 4.55 
Lingual gyrus/posterior cingulate 30 R 66 21 -51 6 4.45* 
Precuneus 7 L 189 -12 -66 36 4.35* 
Inferior parietal lobe 40/7 L 239 -33 -60 45 4.27* 
Middle frontal gyrus 9/46 R 101 51 30 39 4.21* 
   Middle frontal gyrus  R  48 36 27 4.21 
   Middle frontal gyrus  R  45 18 42 4.21 
Thalamus  L 29 -15 -27 12 4.12 
Thalamus  L  -27 -33 12 4.12 
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex 11 R 24 30 48 -9 4.06 
Thalamus  R 37 9 -12 9 3.97 
Pons/midbrain  R 26 0 -15 -33 3.6 
        
 
Height threshold t = 3.44 (p < 0.001) and extent of at least 20 voxels for table inclusion. (A larger 
individual voxel threshold was used here to separate large clusters.)  
Gray highlighting and * signify that the activation survives whole brain correction (p < 0.05) for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level. 
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Table S3.6. Regions more active when accepting delayed rewards controlling for discounted 
stimulus value in GLM-2. 
Region BA Side 
Cluster 
size x y z 
Z 
score 
Cerebellum  R 65 27 -39 -24 4.55 
Inferior frontal/ precentral gyrus 9/6 L 127 -48 3 24 4.27 
–Small volume corrected peak   24 -48 6 24 4.06 s3 
Precentral/inferior frontal gyrus 6/9 R 205 36 -18 36 4.19* 
Occipital cortex 30/18 L 1071 -9 -66 12 4.18* 
Anterior cingulate/orbitofrontal cortex 32/24/10 L 102 -6 30 0 3.99 
–Small volume corrected peak   78 -3 30 0 3.69 s1 
Caudate/putamen  L 77 -21 24 0 3.74 
Precuneus 7 R 20 24 -60 36 3.7 
Thalamus  R 47 6 -6 3 3.66 
Cerebellum  L 35 -54 -54 -30 3.51 
Occipital cortex 18 R 80 24 -87 9 3.45 
Thalamus  R 64 21 -27 0 3.38 
Middle/inferior frontal gyrus 46 L 40 -30 33 15 3.37 
–Small volume corrected peak   18 -33 33 18 3.10 s2 
Cerebellum  L 84 -36 -57 -27 3.36 
Superior frontal gyrus 6 R 35 0 -9 72 3.29 
Superior parietal cortex/precuneus 7 L 114 -18 -75 60 3.29 
Middle frontal gyrus 10/9 R 41 36 48 30 3.21 
Precentral gyrus 6 L 134 -33 -12 60 3.15 
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L 20 -9 -6 57 3.13 
Middle temporal gyrus 37 R 37 48 -51 0 3.09 
Occipital cortex 19 R 51 36 -78 -12 3.03 
        
 
Height threshold t = 2.78 (p < 0.005) and extent of at least 20 voxels for table inclusion. 
Gray highlighting and * signify that the activation survives whole brain correction (p < 0.05) for 
multiple comparisons at the cluster level. 
s1 signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within an anatomical mask of 
vmPFC. 
s2 signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within a 10-mm sphere centered 
on the estimated MNI coordinates from Figner et al. (2010; xyz = [-36 30 27]). 
s3 signifies that the activation survives small volume correction within a 10-mm sphere centered 
on the MNI coordinates from Hare et al. (2009; xyz = [ -48 15 24]). 
  
92 
Table S3.7. Regression coefficients predicting log(k) as a function of DCM parameters. 
Task period DCM parameter vmPFC model vStr model 
Fixed    
 
v à d 9.6 -0.2 
d à v -22.5 -2.8 
    
All choices    
 
v à d -75.3 -128.5 
v self -6.7 19.4 
d à v 59.9 73.9 
d self -13.3 -15.3 
    
Later choices    
 
v à d 43.6 87.7 
v self 2.4 -47.5 
d à v -14.4 -64.3 
d self -10.8 22.4 
    
Driving inputs    
 Value à v 7.8 7.5 Accept à d 21.4 24.7 
    
 
This table reports the regression coefficients from two elastic net regressions using the DCM 
parameters specified above to predict discount rates (log(k)). Comparing the coefficients across 
parameters shows the relative size and direction of the effects of each DCM parameter on 
discount rates. See the main text of the results section for quantification of the influence of each 
parameter on the model’s ability to predict discount rates. 
Note that smaller k values indicate lower discount rates and, therefore, parameters with negative 
regression coefficients increase the likelihood of choosing delayed reward options in our 
temporal discounting paradigm. 
These regressions are identical to those used in the prediction exercises described in the main 
text except that they were run with all 27 subjects at once. The regressions were estimated using 
the DCM parameters for both functional MRI runs separately, and the values listed in this table 
represent the average of coefficients across runs for conciseness and clarity. 
 
The labels ‘Fixed,’ ‘All choices,’ ‘Later choices,’ and ‘Driving inputs’ correspond the portions 
of the DCMs described in the main text and shown in Figure 5.  
The label ‘v à d’ refers to signaling from vmPFC (column 3) or vStr (colum4) to dlPFC-
BA46. The label ‘d à v’ refers to signaling from dlPFC-BA46 to vmPFC (column 3) or vStr 
(colum4). The label ‘v or d self’ refers to the parameters for the inhibitory self-connections to 
each region at the specified time points. The label ‘Value à v’ refers to an input equal to rdSV 
from GLM-2 into vmPFC or dSV into vStr. The label ‘Accept à d’ refers to an input equal the 
Accept regressor specifying later choices in both GLM-1 and GLM-2. 
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Table S3.8. Group-averaged DCM parameters for the model including ventral striatum and 
dlPFC-BA46. 
EC direction Fixed All Choices Later Choices 
vStr à  dlPFC  0.21 (Pc = 1) +0.06 (Pm = 0.88) +0.05 (Pm = 0.85) 
dlPFC à  vStr 0.18 (Pc = 1) +0.07 (Pm = 0.90) +0.06 (Pm = 0.90) 
    
 
Pc = probability that the absolute value of the coupling parameter is greater than zero (rounded 
to two decimals). 
Pm = probability that the coupling parameter is modulated by task condition (rounded to two 
decimals). 
Task input parameters for discounted subjective value as in GLM-1 to vStr and later choices to 
dlPFC-BA46 were (0.04, P = 1; 0.02, P = 1), respectively. 
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   C h a p t e r  4
 
 
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN TEMPORAL DISCOUNTING AND THE NEURAL 
REPRESENTATION OF IMAGINED REWARDSÛ   
Human and non-human animals generally discount the value of delayed rewards, but there are large 
individual differences in the steepness of this discount function. Although widely studied across the 
social and biological sciences, many questions about the psychological and neurobiological 
processes that underlie these differences in temporal discounting behavior remain unresolved. One 
potential factor affecting temporal discounting behavior is the ability to imagine experiencing a 
reward. Here, we present the results of an fMRI investigation of the relationship between 
individual differences in the temporal discounting and neural response in a task where the receipt 
of primary liquid rewards was imagined. We found that, compared to consumption, imagining 
rewards elicited neural response in regions that have been implicated in the processing of both 
real and imagined rewards. Participants who showed relatively greater activity in two of these 
regions, lateral OFC and vmPFC, when imagining the current consumption of juice rewards had 
shallower discount rates when choosing between immediate and delayed monetary rewards. 
Critically, there was no aspect of temporal delay or choice in the juice reward task, suggesting that 
the process of imagining rewards may be a more basic ability that is utilized during intertemporal 
decision making.  
Introduction 
The ability to delay gratification is an important factor in success at the personal and species-wide 
levels102,232. We frequently encounter choices with potential outcomes that can occur immediately or 
in the distant future, and often, waiting pays off in terms of health, wealth, and well-being. Despite 
the logical appeal of forgoing a smaller reward now to obtain a larger reward later, individuals do 
                                                      
Û Work done in collaboration with Todd Hare and Antonio Rangel. 
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not always make the optimal decision and instead, show a tendency to discount the value of delayed 
rewards90,183.  
Behavioral studies of temporal discounting have shown that there is considerable variation across 
individuals on their ability to postpone gratification in order to obtain larger delayed rewards 
(e.g.,59,90). One hypothesis suggests that this variation may be due in part to individual differences in 
the ability to represent the value of future rewards. The human ability to imagine future episodes 
vividly101 may contribute to ITC by allowing individuals to experience an event’s (undiscounted) 
reward value at the time of decision, facilitating self-control behavior54,77,106.  
Recent neuroimaging work has addressed the role of episodic prospection in delay of gratification 
using ITC tasks. Peters and Büchel (2010) demonstrated that participants made more patient, future-
minded choices when presented offers paired with self-generated episodic events in a delay 
discounting task, where high-imagery participants discount rate was on average 16% lower than that 
of low-imagery participants. This “episodic tag effect” was represented in regions including the 
vmPFC and was correlated with neural signals associated with subjective value in the anterior 
cingulate cortex77. Similarly, Benoit and colleagues (2011) manipulated the framing of the 
circumstances under which a future reward would be received; they found that, compared to 
estimating what a particular offer might be able to purchase, imagining spending that amount 
resulted in significantly attenuated temporal discounting. Moreover, participants reported higher 
emotional and experiential intensity for imagined spending trials. Associated neuroimaging data 
revealed that the mPFC was widely activated during imagining, and that a locus in rostral mPFC 
reflected the modulation of the imagination effect by reward magnitude106. Together, these data 
demonstrate that the use of episodic imagery at the time of choice activates prefrontal reward 
networks and enhances future-oriented decision making. These studies do not, however, 
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demonstrate whether it is the episodic nature of the imagery during decision making or rather a 
more fundamental property of reward representation that drives the effect of imagery on ITC. 
In the present study, we examined the relationship between the ability to imagine the receipt of a 
primary rewards in a non-choice context and intertemporal decision making. Participants completed 
an fMRI experiment where they either imagined the receipt of a liquid reward (fruit juice) or 
actually consumed the liquid. Separately, these individuals also completed an ITC task, which 
allowed us to estimate each individual’s discount rate, a parameter that reflects the degree to which 
an individual is able to delay gratification. We sought to determine the extent to which individual 
discount rate was associated with the strength of the neural representation of imagined reward, 
predicting that neural response in regions involved in representing reward imagery would be 
associated with the ability to delay gratification. 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 37 individuals participated in the study. Six people were excluded because 
their experimental data were corrupted or their choice patterns did not allow us to accurately 
estimate discount parameters. A single subject was excluded from the experiment because of 
excessive head movement (≥ 2 mm in translation or rotation). Thirty healthy individuals were 
included (22 males; mean age, 24.2 years; age range, 19-40 years). All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision, no history of neurological, psychiatric, or metabolic illness, and were 
not taking any medications that interfere with the BOLD signal at the time of scanning. The 
Institutional Review Board at the California Institute of Technology (Pasadena, CA) approved the 
methods and procedures used in this study. 
ITC task. The ITC task is described in detail elsewhere (see Chapter 3). Briefly, on each trial, 
participants were instructed to choose between earning a smaller amount of money today and a 
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larger amount at some time in the future. The smaller, sooner offer was always $25 while the larger 
later offer ranged from $25 to $54; the delays ranged from 7 to 200 days in the future.  
We estimated an individual discount factor (denoted by k) for each subject using maximum 
likelihood procedures. Specifically, we assumed that participants assigned value to the delayed 
options using a hyperbolic discounting function, in which the value of $A with a delay of D days is 
given by  
dSV = A/(1+kD), 
where dSV denotes the discounted stimulus value. We also assumed that the probability of 
accepting the delayed option is given by the soft-max function 
P(Yes) = (1+exp(b*(25 - dSV)))-1, 
where b is a non-negative parameter that modulates the slope of the psychometric choice function. 
Note that in this formula the value of the constant reference option is $25. 
Imagine task. Upon arriving for the experiment, participants completed a survey that assessed their 
preference for three fruit juices (apple, grape, or fruit punch) and their current level of thirst. The 
most preferred juice was used during the subsequent neuroimaging experiment. The experiment 
involved the imagined (Imagine) or real consumption (Consume) of water and the preferred juice 
inside the scanner. Water and juice were randomly assigned to either a blue triangle or an orange 
square. These shapes served as cues that identified the type of liquid that would be delivered in each 
trial. After receiving detailed instructions, participants were allowed several practice trials to 
become familiar with receiving liquid rewards in the scanner. 
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At the onset of each trial, a stimulus, that consisted of the colored shape cue surrounded by either a 
gray rectangle (Consume) or a gray thought bubble (Imagine), appeared onscreen for 4 s (Figure 
4.1B).  
 
Figure 4.1. Task diagram. A) Individual trial sequence. B) Reward type (juice or water) was 
signaled by orange square or blue triangle cues. A light gray square or thought bubble 
surrounding the cue indicated either real or imagined consumption of the liquid rewards. 
Participants were instructed to press a button as soon as they had recognized the meaning of the cue 
(i.e., whether it signaled a juice or water trial); the assignment of each liquid to either the left or 
right button was randomized across subjects. This procedure ensured that participants were 
attending to both the onset of the stimulus and the type of cue. In Consume trials, the delivery of 
0.75 mL liquid was initiated at trial onset and reached the mouth after a delay of ~200 ms. 
Participants were instructed to “fully taste the liquid” for the duration of the cue. In Imagine trials, 
no liquid was delivered. Nonetheless, participants were instructed to behave as they did in the 
Consume trials. Thus, they were to imagine tasting the liquid, and concordantly “taste” and “swish 
around” the imaginary liquid. Again, participants were instructed to taste the liquid for the entire 
period that the cue was onscreen. In both trial types, participants were instructed to swallow either 
the real or imaginary liquid when the word ‘swallow’ appeared onscreen. (Instructions are detailed 
in Appendix B.) Each trial was followed by a fixation period (mean = 6 s; range = 4-8 s; Figure 
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4.1A). There were 120 trials in total (30 per condition) divided into eight experimental blocks, and 
each block of either Imagine or Consume was comprised of 15 trials with a mix of both juice and 
water trials. Both block order and stimulus presentation order within blocks were randomized across 
participants. 
Following the fMRI session, participants completed a questionnaire to assess their perceived level 
of success in the task (see Appendix C). Using a 10-point, anchored scale (1 = “not successful at 
all,” 5 = “somewhat successful,” 10 = “extremely successful”), each individual reported how 
successful he or she felt at imagining tasting the liquid overall and separately for water and juice. 
Additionally, participants were asked to report how similar the experiences of imagining and 
consuming were both overall and separately for each liquid, where (1 = “not similar at all,” 5 = 
“somewhat similar,” 10 = “extremely similar”). The similarity ratings were not obtained for one 
subject. 
Imaging data acquisition. Functional imaging data were collected using a Siemens (Erlangen, 
Germany) 3.0 Tesla Trio MRI scanner. Using an eight-channel, phased array head coil, we collected 
gradient echo, T2*-weighted EPI images with BOLD contrast. In order to optimize BOLD 
sensitivity, we used a tilted acquisition in an orientation 30o oblique to the AC-PC line159. The 
imaging parameters were as follows: TR = 2500 ms; TE = 30 ms; flip angle = 80o; FOV = 192 mm; 
in-plane resolution = 3 mm x 3 mm; and 40 3 mm slices (0.3 mm gap) with ascending, interleaved 
acquisition. The first four volumes of each run were discarded to allow for sufficient time for the 
magnetic field to achieve steady-state magnetization. Task order was counterbalanced across 
participants over two sessions (285 volumes per session). High-resolution, whole-brain, T1-
weighted structural images (TR = 1500 ms; TE = 3.05 ms; flip angle = 10o; voxel resolution = 1 
mm3; single-shot, ascending acquisition) were also collected for each of the participants. These 
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images were co-registered with the their respective EPI images to assist with the anatomical 
localization of the functional activations.  
fMRI data preprocessing. Imaging data were preprocessed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of 
Imaging Neuroscience, Institute of Neurology, London, UK). Data were corrected for motion with 
realignment to the mean image, spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute EPI 
template and resampled to 3 mm3 voxels, and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel (full-
width-at-half-maximum = 8 mm). Data were also temporally filtered using a filter width of 128 s. 
All images were visualized using MRIcron software (http://www.sph.sc.edu/comd/rorden/mricron/).  
GLM. First, we estimated a GLM with AR(1) for each individual. We specified five regressors, one 
for each of the possible trial conditions (i.e., R1: Consume Water, R2: Consume Juice, R3: Imagine 
Water, R4: Imagine Juice) and one for all Swallow (R5) trials. All events were modeled with their 
full stimulus duration (4.22 s for R1-4 and 1 s for R5). Motion parameters and session constants 
were also included as regressors of no interest.  
At the first level, we computed contrasts for regressors R1-4, the main effect of [Imagine - 
Consume], and contrasts for imagining versus consuming juice controlling for responses to water 
[(Imagine Juice - Imagine Water) - (Consume Juice - Consume Water)]. These contrasts were 
entered into a 2x2 ANOVA, one-sample t-tests, or between-subject correlations with discount rate 
at the second level. We corrected for multiple comparisons across the whole brain using Gaussian 
Random Field Theory at the cluster level (p < 0.05) with an individual voxel threshold of p < 0.001. 
For completeness, we also report all clusters with an extent greater than 10 voxels at p < 0.001 in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.  
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Between-subject correlations with the discount parameter k and contrasts estimates from ROIs 
(defined by separate and independent studies) were computed in MATLAB (Version 8.0.0.783, The 
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts). 
Results 
Behavioral Results. Post-task ratings suggested that participants were able to perform the 
imagination and liquid reward task as instructed. Participants indicated that they felt at least 
somewhat successful in imagining the receipt of liquid rewards during the Imagine trials (mean 
success rating = 5.67, SD = 1.97; rating of 5 = “somewhat successful”) and that the experience of 
imagining was similar to actually receiving the liquids (mean similarity rating = 5.97, SD = 1.59; 
rating of 5 = “somewhat similar”). Lastly, the pleasantness ratings for juice and water receipt 
demonstrated that, at the group level, participants found the juice to be significantly more pleasant 
than water (juice: mean = 5.83, SD = 0.83; water: mean = 4.83, SD = 1.53; t29 = 2.86, p = 0.008).  
Discount rates (k) for future rewards were computed based on the choices made during a separate 
ITC task using a standard hyperbolic model as described in Chapter 3. This parameter represents the 
degree to which an individual discounts or reduces the value of rewards obtained at a later date, and 
thus smaller values of k indicate a greater willingness to delay gratification. The discount 
parameters in the current sample ranged from 0.0005 to 0.0267 (mean = 0.0079, SD = 0.0069). 
fMRI Results. We computed a 2x2 ANOVA to identify regions showing main effects or 
interactions of the factors action (Consume, Imagine) and liquid (Juice, Water). While there were 
main effects of action (depicted in Figure 4.2; p < 0.05, whole-brain corrected), there were no 
significant effects for liquid or any interactions after correction for multiple comparisons. Areas in 
the prefrontal, parietal, occipital, and fusiform cortices were more active during Imagine compared 
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to Consume trials (Table 4.1), while bilateral regions of the insula showed more activity for 
Consume versus Imagine trials (Table 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2. Voxels showing a significant difference between real and imagined consumption of 
liquid rewards. The warm color scale depicts voxels that are more active during the Imagine 
condition compared to Consume, while the cool color scale shows voxels that are more active 
during Consume compared to Imagine. 
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Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 618 10/46/47 -39 38 9 4.68* 
Right inferior parietal lobule 136 39/40 51 -75 42 4.67* 
Left middle occipital gyrus 104 19 -48 -69 -12 4.64 
Supplementary motor cortex 147 6 -3 18 72 4.31 
Extrastriate cortex 171 18/19 6 -99 36 4.27 
Right fusiform gyrus 472 19/37 51 -69 -15 4.14* 
Right precentral gyrus 25 6 54 -3 60 4.11 
Subgenual cingulate cortex 51 25 -6 21 -6 3.99 
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex 290 9/32 -3 30 36 3.93* 
Right cerebellum 22  18 -39 -60 3.78 
Left middle temporal gyrus 10 21 -69 -33 -15 3.75 
Right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 30 47 48 30 3 3.74 
Right middle frontal gyrus 11 10 42 54 -3 3.74 
Left cerebellum 149  -39 -51 -45 3.67 
Left inferior parietal lobule 24 39 -51 -78 33 3.62 
Left precentral gyrus 30 6 -42 -3 66 3.61 
Right cerebellum 27  36 -84 -33 3.54 
Right precentral gyrus 17 6 33 12 72 3.53 
Right middle temporal gyrus 30 21 57 -45 -3 3.51 
Precuneus 12 7 3 -57 72 3.42 
Left superior frontal gyrus 15 8 -33 24 54 3.41 
Paracentral lobule 15 3 -3 -27 81 3.38 
Left precentral gyrus 17 6 -36 9 66 3.36 
Right caudate 10  9 21 9 3.33 
Left middle temporal gyrus 11 37 -57 -51 -12 3.30 
              
 
Table 4.1. Regions more active for Imagine compared to Consume.  
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 88 voxels). k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
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Region k BA x y z  Peak Z score 
Right insula 306 13 39 -3 3 5.77* 
Left insula 462 13 -42 -6 3 5.43* 
Pons 166  9 -27 -24 4.51 
Posterior cingulate gyrus 17 31 -18 -27 45 4.24 
Right precentral gyrus 18 6 24 -6 51 3.78 
Right supramarginal gyrus 20 40 42 -32 42 3.61 
Left postcentral gyrus 28 4 -63 -21 27 3.42 
Right postcentral gyrus 21 2/3 57 -21 27 3.42 
              
 
Table 4.2. Regions for active for Consume compared to Imagine. 
All results are reported at p < 0.001, uncorrected, with cluster extent ≥ 10 voxels.  
* Whole-brain corrected for multiple comparisons (p < 0.05) at the cluster level (minimum cluster 
size = 88 voxels). k = cluster size. Coordinates reported in MNI space. 
Discount rates and neural responses to imagined reward. To test our main hypothesis that the 
ability to simulate reward receipt through imagination is associated with the degree to which future 
rewards are discounted, we conducted two between-subjects correlations for imagining versus 
consuming juice, controlling for water, and the estimated discount parameter k. We computed this 
correlation in ROIs defined on the basis of previous, independent reports on the neural activity 
associated with the hedonic value of liquid rewards and the imagination of reward receipt. The first 
region was defined as a sphere (radius = 10 mm) centered on the peak coordinates (MNI xyz = [0 
33 -21]) in a vmPFC region that was modulated by imagining reward receipt in a previous study233. 
This analysis was designed to test whether individuals who where more willing to wait for future 
monetary payments (i.e., had lower discount parameters) showed increased neural activity for 
imagined rewards in a region previously implicated in imagining rewards; there was a negative 
correlation between k and BOLD response in this region (Pearson’s r = -0.36; one-tailed p = 0.026; 
Figure 4.3A). The second region was defined as a 10-mm radius sphere centered on the peak 
response (MNI xyz coordinates = [38 42 -10]) in right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC) for 
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receiving preferred liquid rewards234. This analysis was designed to test whether subjects with lower 
discount parameters had increased neural activity for imagined rewards in a region sensitive to the 
actual receipt of liquid reward. In support of this hypothesis, we found a negative correlation 
(Pearson’s r = -0.40; one-tailed p = 0.01) between discount parameters and the difference between 
imagined and real juice rewards [(Imagine Juice - Imagine Water) - (Consume Juice - Consume 
Water)] (Figure 4.3B).  
 
Figure 4.3. Imagination and discounting. Scatter plots depicting the relationship between the 
contrast coefficients for [(Imagine Juice - Imagine Water) - (Consume Juice - Consume Water]) 
averaged across the (A) vmPFC and (B) right lOFC regions of interest. 
It should be noted that although the k parameters were not normally distributed, the Pearson 
correlation method does not assume normality and, therefore, we did not apply any transformations 
to the k parameters. Nonetheless, calculating the correlations with k using the non-parametric, rank-
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dependent Spearman method yields results that are consistent with the Pearson correlation for these 
data (vmPFC: Spearman’s rho = -0.32, one-tailed p = 0.040; lOFC: Spearman’s rho = -0.39, one-
tailed p = 0.016). 
For completeness, we also conducted a whole-brain, between-subjects correlation analysis with the 
discount parameters and the contrast of imagining versus consuming juice after subtracting out the 
water control from both conditions. There was one significant cluster spreading across the thalamus 
and midbrain (peak Z = 4.48, MNI xyz coordinates = [-3 -18 -3]) showing a negative correlation 
with k that survived whole brain correction at p < 0.05. There were no regions that showed 
significant positive correlations with k after correction for multiple comparisons.  
Discussion 
We investigated the brain-behavior associations underlying the ability to imagine the receipt of a 
primary reward and temporal discounting behavior. Consistent with the hypothesis that individuals 
who generate greater neural responses for imagined rewards would show greater propensity to delay 
gratification, we found that temporal discounting was negatively correlated with brain activity in 
regions previously associated with the processing of both real and imagined rewards24,233-236. These 
data suggest that the strength of the neural representation of imagined rewards may drive individual 
differences in real-world economic decision-making. 
Neural response to consumption and imagination of rewarding liquids. Compared to Imagine 
trials, Consume trials exhibited greater neural response in bilateral insula. While the responses 
elicited by our task do not extend to the primary gustatory areas of anterior insula/frontal 
operculum237 (AI/FO), they are centered in regions of the insula thought to be involved in 
interoception, or awareness of the physiological state167,168. One possible explanation for the lack of 
primary gustatory cortex activation for Consume compared to Imagine is the relative infrequency of 
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neurons responsive to taste or tactile stimulation of the mouth in AI/FO (6% and 4% of neurons, 
respectively, compared to 24% sensitive to mouth and jaw movements)238. Note that participants 
were instructed to keep their head and jaw as still as possible while performing the same “swishing” 
movements inside the mouth in both the Consume and Imagine conditions. The similarity of mouth 
movements, therefore, may have obscured any differences between conditions in primary gustatory 
cortex. 
In contrast, compared to consumption, imagining the receipt of an appetitive liquid activated a 
distributed network of both cortical and subcortical regions, with particularly significant activations 
in left vlPFC, right inferior parietal lobule, right fusiform gyrus, and dorsomedial PFC. These data 
are consistent with the findings of a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of sensorimotor 
imagery, which reported regions involved in both modality-general and gustatory-specific 
imagery239. Moreover, our findings, which suggest that the coordination of a variety of higher-order 
areas facilitates imagery processes, are aligned with McNorgan’s theory (2012) positing that 
imagery generation depends mainly on the recruitment of “upstream […] unimodal convergence 
zones,” rather than primary sensory cortices239. 
Relationship between temporal discounting and imagined reward. Study participants exhibited a 
wide range of temporal discounting behavior, and these differences in willingness to wait were 
correlated with significant variation in BOLD responses in lateral OFC and vmPFC regions 
previously associated with processing both real and imagined rewards. A negative correlation 
between the willingness to delay gratification (as indexed by discount rate) and neural responses to 
imagined rewards was identified in right lOFC, a region that has been shown to respond to the 
actual receipt of liquid rewards234, and during the anticipation of primary rewards240, suggesting that 
this region may play a role in evaluating both expected and received primary rewards. A similar 
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relationship between neural response and discount rate was seen in a vmPFC region previously 
implicated in the representation of imagined rewards233,241, such that increased willingness to delay 
gratification was associated with an enhanced response for imagining compared to consuming a 
rewarding liquid. Bray and colleagues (2010) have previously shown that vmPFC is activated when 
imagining rewards, but not when imagining visual motion or motor actions233, and neural activity in 
vmPFC has been linked repeatedly to the processing of primary and secondary reward values at the 
time of decision making in addition to reflecting reward outcome or receipt (e.g., 75,136,193,194,242-244). 
Moreover, prior expectations have been found to influence vmPFC responses to the receipt of 
appetitive liquids245. Plassmann and colleagues showed that cognitive expectations developed from 
information about the price of wines could modulate responses in vmPFC to wine consumption and 
that these vmPFC responses scaled with subjective pleasantness ratings.  Together, these previous 
results are consistent with the idea that vmPFC is involved in computing the pleasantness or utility 
of outcomes and can be influenced by both the presence and expectation of rewards. In light of our 
current data, these findings suggest that a greater ability to imagine and simulate rewarding 
experiences in vmPFC – regardless of when these rewards occur – can reduce the discounting of 
future outcomes. 
Our data complement and extend previous findings on the role of imagery and time perception in 
ITC. Two neuroimaging studies77,106 have shown that enhancing the concreteness and vividness 
(i.e., aiding imagination) of a future outcome at the time of choice enhanced hippocampal-prefrontal 
interactions and reduced discount rates. We demonstrate an association between imagining the 
experience (i.e., consuming right now) of primary rewards in the absence of choice and monetary 
discounting behavior in a separate ITC task. Note that unlike these previous studies, which 
enhanced the vividness of future monetary outcomes to reduce discounting, our data link individual 
differences in reward imagination across modality (juice versus money) and time (now versus 
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future) to discount rates. These findings suggest that a fundamental ability to imagine the utility of 
both present and future outcomes may enhance the ability to delay gratification and promote 
optimal choice behavior. Another recent study246 has shown that BOLD responses in the ventral 
striatum and vmPFC during the evaluation of temporal durations (e.g., 28 days), also in the absence 
of choice, are correlated with temporal discounting rates. Thus, individual differences in the neural 
representation of imagined reward consumption and the perception of delays are predictive of 
individual differences in delay of gratification behaviors. Interestingly, both reward imagination and 
delay perception predict ITC behavior when measured in the absence of actual choices, making 
them potentially useful diagnostic measures when choice behavior cannot be collected for ethical or 
practical reasons. The cognitive and neurobiological processes of both reward imagination and 
delay perception present intriguing targets for future research on temporal discounting behaviors 
and potential avenues for therapeutic interventions aimed at improving the ability to delay 
immediate gratification in favor better long-term outcomes.   
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   C h a p t e r  5
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Defining goals and implementing the appropriate behaviors necessary to achieve them are central 
functions of human cognition. The PFC is crucial for such goal-directed decision making, and its 
comparatively large size247 and richly elaborated connections to other brain regions are thought to 
be critical to the relative success of both human and non-human primates10. Functional and 
structural neuroimaging in behaving humans has provided compelling support for this theory, 
showing that regions of the PFC are important for a wide variety of learning and decision making 
paradigms, especially when cognitive control is required4,10. Nonetheless, the diverse range of 
prefrontocortical functions and the many methods used to study them have left many aspects of the 
neurobiology of cognitive control uncharacterized, particularly with respect to individual 
differences in cognitive control ability. The work described in this thesis provides additional 
functional evidence for the role of the PFC in cognitive control, describing how learned 
automaticity impacts prefrontocortical flexibility in implementing cognitive control (Chapter 2) and 
also elaborating the nature of neural processes and connections involved in delaying gratification in 
ITC (Chapters 3 and 4). 
One critical role of the PFC is to organize behaviors using hierarchical rules85,248,249, providing a 
framework for the optimization of behavior through goal prioritization. Crucially, this system is 
robust to environmental changes, and cognitive control can be implemented quickly and flexibly in 
response to changes in reward contingency. Response inhibition is central to cognitive control, 
facilitating the execution of context-appropriate, goal-directed behaviors through the suppression of 
inappropriate responses. In Chapter 2, we showed that the right vlPFC – a region that has 
consistently been implicated in response inhibition – plays an important role in suppressing these 
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competing responses, even as they become more automatic with increasing exposure over time. 
Specifically, as automaticity emerges in response to frequent events, cognitive control ability for 
relatively rare events develops with exposure to infrequent events, and this enhanced performance is 
associated with a neural efficiency signal (i.e., a decrease in BOLD signal with learning over time) 
in right vlPFC. These data suggest that individual differences in cognitive control ability – 
especially with respect to the capacity to adapt behavior to a rapidly changing environment – may 
be modulated by the extent to which learning of cognitive control is encoded efficiently in right 
vlPFC. Future work will be necessary to validate this theory further. 
The PFC is also able to negotiate decisions that involve the assessment of outcomes that are less 
immediate and more abstract (e.g., choosing a healthy food item to support a long-term weight loss 
goal). Cognitive control is critical for these decisions, particularly in light of the extensive evidence 
demonstrating that humans67,68 and other species60,62,65,66 exhibit a strong tendency towards temporal 
discounting. The reciprocal connections between subcortical regions and PFC7-9 are thought to 
facilitate cognitive control in situations such as intertemporal choice10,77,82, allowing for top-down 
modulation of emotion and reward circuitry by PFC. Using dynamic causal modeling – a technique 
that allows for the estimation of directional effective connectivity between regions200 – we were 
able to describe the functional nature of the circuit between left dlPFC and vmPFC during ITC. We 
found that the strength of the unidirectional, modulatory connection from left dlPFC to vmPFC, is 
enhanced at the time of choice only in trials when the delayed option is chosen. The strength of this 
connection was also predictive of individual behavior, again demonstrating a link between brain and 
behavior. Moreover, these data support a neurocomputational model of cognitive regulation of the 
self that is consistent with both intertemporal74,79,80,212 and dietary choice88,89; this parsimonious 
model offers a step toward consolidation of a diverse literature and may also be instructive in 
furthering understanding of lapses in self-control in both healthy and clinical populations. 
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Additionally, we examined the relationship between discounting behavior and the neural 
representation of reward, finding a positive correlation between the strength of neural response in 
regions associated with both real and imagined rewards (lateral OFC and vmPFC, respectively) and 
the ability to delay gratification in a separate ITC task. Again, these findings underscore the utility 
of an individual differences-based approach in studying the neuroscience of cognitive control, 
particularly since inter-individual variability in this domain of executive function is not only 
ubiquitous in healthy decision making250 but also marks dysfunction in many forms of 
psychopathology, including substance abuse disorders94-97. An individual differences-based 
approach enhances both experimental and inferential power250,251, allowing for a shift from 
traditional methods that emphasize group statistics to techniques that capitalize on individual 
variability. Future studies should take advantage of the intense variability evident in each 
individual’s brain structure and function, as well as its link to environmental states252, since these 
factors may offer particular insight into how individual cognitive control ability varies depending on 
context and experience. Fully elaborating the relationships between these factors will be 
instrumental in developing a mechanistic model of cognitive control and identifying potential 
targets for therapeutic intervention in many psychological disorders. 
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IMACON Post-Task Questionnaire 
 
1. Overall, how successful were you at imagining tasting the liquid? Please rate 
your success on the scale below, where 1 is “not successful at all,” 5 is 
“somewhat successful,” and 10 is “extremely successful.” Please use the 
intermediate ratings if you fall between those categories. 
 
      not at all        somewhat                                extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. Was there a difference in your ability to imagine tasting the juice and the water? 
 
YES      NO 
 
3. If yes, please indicate your success (using the same scale as above) for both 
juice and water: 
 
JUICE: 
 
       not at all        somewhat                                extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
WATER: 
 
       not at all        somewhat                                extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
4. If you did succeed at imagining the taste of the liquids, how similar was your 
imaginary taste experience to the real experience of tasting the liquids? Please 
rate the similarity on the scale below, where 1 is “not similar at all,” 5 is 
“somewhat similar,” and 10 is “extremely similar.” Please use the intermediate 
ratings if you fall between those categories. 
 
       not at all        somewhat                                extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
5. Was there a difference in between the juice and the water for how similar the 
imaginary experience was to the actual tasting experience? 
 
YES      NO 
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6. If yes, please indicate the similarity (using the same scale as in question 4) for 
both juice and water: 
 
JUICE: 
 
       not at all        somewhat                                extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
WATER: 
 
       not at all        somewhat                                extremely 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
7. Is there anything else you’d like to tell us about your experience? 
 
